"If We Consider The Possibility That The Lexical Item Construes The Meaning Potential Of The Lexeme"

Fontaine (2017: 10):

Context, co-text and collocation: Where do (new) meanings come from?

Since within the SFL framework, grammar and lexis are considered, as mentioned above (cf. Martin, 1992), as in essence the same but differentiated by degrees of generality, it is difficult to talk about lexical meaning outside of grammar. However, while I would agree this is not effectively possible since every lexical item is instantiated in text and therefore is fully integrated in the grammatical construction in which it appears. However, if we consider the possibility that the lexical item construes the meaning potential of the lexeme, then we can begin to see a way to capture lexical meaning through the lens of context, even if this is by analogy.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained here, grammar and lexis are not "in essence the same", since they differ in kind both syntagmatically and paradigmatically. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 59, 64):

On either of these two axes we can establish relationships of a lexical kind (collocations and sets) and of a grammatical kind (structures and systems). …

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the meaning of a lexical item is the semantic correlate of the lexicogrammatical features that specify a lexical item. The reason Fontaine uses the term 'lexical meaning' is that she draws on work from theories that are inconsistent with SFL Theory, where the distinction is between form and meaning, and where lexis is viewed 'from below' (from form), such that a lexical item, as form, can be assigned several meanings.

[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, lexical items, like all of language, are modelled as both potential and instance, not just as instance.

[4] To be clear, here Fontaine again confuses word as lexical item with word as grammatical constituent. It is the word as grammatical constituent that is "fully integrated in the grammatical construction in which it appears", not the word as lexical item.

[5] To be clear, here Fontaine confuses the theoretical dimension of stratification (lexical item construes meaning) with the dimension of instantiation (lexical item as instance of potential).

[6] To be clear, this suggests that Fontaine is unaware that SFL already models the lexical item as both potential and instance.

[7] To be clear, in SFL Theory, context is the culture as semiotic system — instantiated as a situation — which is realised in language (and other semiotic systems). Considering this unnecessary appeal to context, together with [3] and [6], it would appear that Fontaine thinks that the cline of instantiation only applies to the stratum of context.

"The Need For Flexibility In Lexical Representation"

Fontaine (2017: 10):

In other functional approaches, the need for flexibility in lexical representation is being identified. For example, more flexible lexical representations and flexible lexicon (García Velasco, 2016), flexible word classes (Rijkhoff and van Lier, 2013) and fluid grammar (Steels and De Beule, 2006 and Steels, 2011). Indeed, cognitive models also suggest the need for a more flexible grammar. Pickering and Garrod (2004:21) state that their model of interactive alignment “challenges linguists to come up with a more flexible account of grammar capable of capturing linguistic constraints on linked sentence fragments”. While a detailed look at flexible models is beyond the scope of this paper, these approaches have influenced my thinking on this topic. In the next section I will argue for a loosening of semantics in terms of lexical representation to allow for the meaning potential (Hanks, 2013) of a lexeme instantiated by a lexical item.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the needs of theories that do not share the same theoretical assumptions and method of inquiry are not evidence of the needs of SFL Theory. The need for this type of flexibility in such approaches stems from viewing language 'from below' (from the expression of meaning) rather than 'from above' (from the meaning that is expressed) — the latter being the perspective taken in SFL Theory.

[2] As previously explained, the notion of lexical representation in a mental lexicon is inconsistent with SFL Theory and, as Edelman (1989: 228) argues, inconsistent with 'the known facts of human biology and brain science'.

[3] As will be seen in the examination of the next section, this loosening of semantics — despite the location of lexical items on the lexicogrammatical stratum — involves viewing language 'from below', such that a single form is the expression of different meanings. This is the opposite perspective of the  view 'from above' in SFL Theory, which takes meaning as the point of departure, and inquires as to how it is expressed lexically.

[4] To be clear, unknown to Fontaine, the instantiation relation between a lexical item as potential and as instance is already part of the architecture of SFL Theory, and it is a relation that obtains on the lexicogrammatical stratum, not the semantic stratum.

"Some Issues That Need To Be Resolved"

Fontaine (2017: 10):

There are some issues that need to be resolved if we want to claim as Hasan does that realisation mediates between networks and structures (Hasan, 1996:74) since as concerns lexis, this suggests that a single lexical item is “the expression of a set of choices made in the system network” (Halliday, 1972/2013:8). The close connection of delicacy and paradigmatic arrangement can only take us so far; e.g. if lexical meaning is in part at least in its collocational associations or frames, it is difficult to think of lexical meaning as having paradigmatic relations. Even the definition of word and lexical item or the distinction between lexical/content words and grammatical/function words are areas which are not yet fully explained in terms of lexical representation.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, there are no theoretical "issues that need to be resolved" here. As will be seen below, the "issues" only arise from Fontaine's lack of familiarity with SFL Theory.

[2] To be clear, this is not merely Hasan's claim, but a statement of the architecture of SFL Theory. The relation between the paradigmatic axis (system) and the syntagmatic axis (structure) is realisation; that is, they are different levels of symbolic abstraction: structure (Token) realises system (Value).

[3] To be clear, the Hasan quote on grammar does not "suggest" the Halliday quote on lexis. Hasan is concerned with the realisation relation between grammatical systems and grammatical structures, such as those of clause rank, whereas Halliday is concerned with the realisation relation between the most delicate grammatical systems and lexical items (which are not structures).

[4] To be clear, the "close connection of delicacy and paradigmatic arrangement" is that delicacy is the ordering principle of paradigmatic order (system); see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 20).

[5] To be clear, collocation is the syntagmatic dimension of lexical items, whereas paradigmatically, lexical items function in sets. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 61):

Paradigmatically, lexical items function in sets having shared semantic features and common patterns of collocation. … Typically, the semantic features that link the members of a lexical set are those of synonymy or antonymy, hyponymy and meronymy;

[6] To be clear, in addition to the paradigmatic relations between lexical items — synonymy etc. — each lexical item is specified by a bundle of paradigmatic features, just as, on the phonological stratum, the phoneme /k/ is specified by the feature bundle [voiceless, velar, stop].

[7] To be clear, these aspects "are not yet fully explained in terms of lexical representation" because the notion of lexical representation in a mental lexicon is inconsistent with SFL Theory and, according to Edelman (1989: 228), with 'the known facts of human biology and brain science'.

However, within SFL Theory, the distinction between word as grammatical unit and word as lexical item is clearly defined (see the previous quote from Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 568-9), as is the distinction between 'grammatical/function' words, and 'lexical/content' words. Unlike 'lexical' words, 'grammatical' words are those that 'function as the direct realisation of terms in grammatical systems' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 64).

"SFL Needs To Offer Detail On Multiword Expressions And On Polysemy Vs Homonymy"

Fontaine (2017: 10):

However, the nature of lexical representation is not clearly articulated in SFL. As Davidse (2017:79) makes very clear, “linguistic theories specify one’s fundamental assumptions about language and the nature of the linguistic sign. It is within these assumptions that the facts of a language are described – that is, its categories identified and interpreted”. The preference in lexical representation for homonymy or polysemy is not theory neutral, there are assumptions related to each position. SFL needs to offer detail on multiword expressions (MWEs) and on polysemy vs homonymy.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, lexical representation in a mental lexicon is inconsistent with SFL Theory, which accounts for its lack of articulation in SFL Theory.

[2] This is very true. This is why it is very important to understand the assumptions of the theory being used.

[3] This is very true. The assumptions on which lexical representation and modelling lexis in terms of homonymy and polysemy are based are those of other theories, and are not consistent with the assumptions of SFL Theory.

[4] To be clear, as already explained, the notions of polysemy and homonymy view the lexical item 'from below', which is inconsistent with SFL Theory, which views the lexical item 'from above': the meaning it realises. Polysemy views the lexical item as grammatical form that realises many meanings, whereas homonymy views the lexical item as (shared) phonological form.

The approach of SFL Theory to multi-word expressions, such as phrasal verbs, is systemic. For example, the experiential function of put up with as a Process is argued by reference to its agnate tolerate.

Fontaine's Argument Against Lexis As Most Delicate Grammar

Fontaine (2017: 9-10):

As mentioned above, Martin points out the backgrounding of lexis in SFL, suggesting that this is related to an account of lexis as most delicate grammar. This view of lexis brings with it some degree of risk since it could result in treating lexis as taxonomically organised and this could lead to prioritising homophonous lexical relations rather than semantic ones. The reason for this is that if we take as a starting point Halliday's (1972/2013:8) view that “the output of any path through the network of systems is a structure”, the ‘most’ delicate system will lead directly to a lexical item (cf criticisms by Hunston and Francis, 2000 and Groom, 2005). This is a view of lexical representation which would be very difficult to accept for most lexicologists as it would predict that a lexeme with polysemes would need to be available at the terminal point of a variety of systems.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misunderstands Martin's claim. To be clear, Martin claims that what has been backgrounded is Halliday's distinction between grammatical words and lexical items and a syntagmatic perspective on lexical items. Martin (2016:45):

Firth's interest in collocation (‘the company words keep’) has been developed in corpus linguistic research – chiefly by Sinclair and his colleagues (e.g. 1966; 1991) but less so in SFL where Halliday's early acknowledgement of the distinction between words and lexical items and the need for a syntagmatic perspective on expectancy relations among lexical items has tended to be backgrounded in relation to an interest in lexis as delicate grammar (the ‘grammarian's dream’, pursued by Hasan, and others).

See here for the misunderstandings in Martin's claim.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, paradigmatically, relations between lexical items can be represented as hyponymic and meronymic taxonomies. It is just such relations that are exploited in lexical cohesion.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. To classify lexical items in terms of how they are realised in phonology ("homophonous') is to take the view 'from below', which is the direct opposite of SFL Theory, which takes the view 'from above' (the meaning being realised in wording).

[4] This is a non-sequitur. The specification of grammatical structures and lexical items by lexicogrammatical systems does not entail classifying lexical items according to how they are realised in phonology.

[5] See here for the misunderstandings of Hunston and Francis (2000). (Fontaine does not outline the criticisms of Groom (2005).)

[6] To be clear, as [3] demonstrates, this is a view that is not consistent with SFL Theory, and as [4] demonstrates, this is a view that is not validated by Fontaine's argument. Moreover, the acceptability judgements of lexicologists are irrelevant to SFL Theory, unless they uncover inconsistency in the architecture of SFL Theory, or inabilities of the theory to account for data.

[7] This is misleading, because it is untrue. On the one hand, Fontaine again takes the view 'from below', identifying lexemes as expressions of many meanings ("polysemes"), instead of the SFL view 'from above', where a lexeme is identified as the meaning that is expressed. On the other hand, the conclusion does not follow from the argument presented, as [3] and [4] demonstrate.

Halliday's "Call To Develop Work" On Lexical Representation

Fontaine (2017: 9):

The call to develop work in this area can be traced back to Halliday's 1961 paper, where he put forward the ground-breaking idea that “the ‘lexical item,’ is unrestricted grammatically; grammatical categories do not apply to it, and the abstraction of the item itself from a number of occurrences … depends on the formal, lexical relations into which it enters” (1961:277). At that time, he expected that “it should not be long before we find out much more about how language works at this level” (ibid.), since working out large scale frequencies of items in collocation would no longer be difficult. However, we have not yet seen this kind of detailed work, perhaps with the exception of Tucker (e.g. 1996).

Blogger Comments:

This is misleading, because it is untrue. To be clear, Halliday (1961) — on Scale and Category Grammar, not Systemic Functional Grammar — is not a "call to develop work" in lexical representation. Rather, its stated purpose is demonstrate how 'to bring lexis in relation to grammar', which, importantly, involves distinguishing the lexical item from the word as grammatical unit. Halliday (2002 [1961]: 59-61):

8 Lexis
8.1 This section is intended merely to bring lexis into relation with grammar, not to discuss the theory of lexis as such. As has been pointed out (above, 3.3. and 6.3), there is no one / one correspondence in exponence between the item which enters into lexical relations and any one of the grammatical units. It is for this reason that the term lexical item is used in preference to word, “word” being reserved as the name for a grammatical unit, that unit whose exponents, more than those of any other unit, are lexical items. 

Not only may the lexical item be coextensive with more than one different grammatical unit; it may not be coextensive with any grammatical unit at all, and may indeed cut right across the rank hierarchy. Moreover, since the abstraction involved is quite different, what is for lexis “the same” lexical item (that is, different occurrences of the same formal item) may be a number of different grammatical items, so it is not true that one lexical item always has the same relation to the rank hierarchy. So that, in English, (i) a lexical item may be a morpheme, word or group (at least); (ii) a lexical item may be assigned to no rank, being for example more than a word but less than a whole group, or even both more and less than a word – part of one word plus the whole of another, sometimes discontinuously; and (iii) one and the same lexical item may in different occurrences cover any range of the possibilities under (i) and (ii). 

This does not mean that lexical items cannot be identified in grammar; it means that they are not identified by rank. They are identified, as has been suggested (above, 6.3), by their being unaccounted for in systems. But it is an additional, descriptive reason (additional, that is, to the theoretical one that lexical items lend themselves to different relations of abstraction) for keeping grammar and lexis apart. When the two have been described separately, the next stage is to relate them; and it is here that the complex relation between lexical item and grammatical unit must be accounted for. This is exactly parallel to what was said above (7.1) about grammar and phonology; and, of course, it applies equally to phonology and lexis, where, after separate description, is displayed the relationship between the lexical item and the categories of phonology. 

8.2 The task of lexis can be summed up, by illustration, as that it has to account for the likelihood of wingless green insects and for the, by contrast, unlikelihood of colourless green ideas. As in grammar, we shall expect language to work by contrasting “more likely” with “less likely” rather than “possible” with “impossible”; but, as has often been pointed out, this particular type of likelihood is not accounted for by grammar, at least not by grammar of the delicacy it has yet attained. It is, however, too often assumed that what cannot be stated grammatically cannot be stated formally: that what is not grammar is semantics, and here, some would add, linguistics gives up. But the view that the only formal linguistics is grammar might be described as a colourless green idea that sleeps furiously between the sheets of linguistic theory, preventing the bed from being made. What are needed are theoretical categories for the formal description of lexis. 

It seems that two fundamental categories are needed, which we may call collocation and set. The first basic distinction between these and the categories of grammar is that in lexis there are no scales of rank and exponence. There is no hierarchy of units; therefore no rank scale. There is only one degree of abstraction – a set is a set of formal items and a collocation is a collocation of formal items; therefore no exponence scale (exponence there is, of course, but it is a simple polarity). Only the scale of delicacy remains; sets and collocations can be more and less delicate. 

There is an analogy with the categories of grammar, an analogy due to the nature of language as activity. Collocation, like structure, accounts for a syntagmatic relation; set, like class and system, for a paradigmatic one. There the resemblance ends. 

Collocation is the syntagmatic association of lexical items, quantifiable, textually, as the probability that there will occur, at n removes (a distance of n lexical items) from an item x, the items a, b, c . . . Any given item thus enters into a range of collocation, the items with which it is collocated being ranged from more to less probable; and delicacy is increased by the raising of the value of n and by the taking account of the collocation of an item not only with one other but with two, three or more other items. Items can then be grouped together by range of collocation, according to their overlap of, so to speak, collocational spread. The paradigmatic grouping which is thereby arrived at is the set. The set does not form a closed system, but is an open grouping varying in delicacy from “having some (arbitrary minimum) collocation in common” to subsets progressively differentiated as the degree of collocational likeness set as defining criterion increases. 

In lexis, as in grammar, it is essential to distinguish between formal and contextual meaning. Once the formal description has identified the categories and the items, these can and must be treated contextually. The formal item of lexis, the lexical item, is unrestricted grammatically; grammatical categories do not apply to it, and the abstraction of the item itself from a number of occurrences (including, for example, the answer to the question whether one is to recognise one lexical item or more than one) depends on the formal, lexical relations into which it enters. The nature of these relations is such that formal statements in lexis require textual studies involving large-scale frequency counts: not of course of the frequency of single items, but of items in collocation. Since these are no longer difficult to undertake, it should not be long before we find out much more about how language works at this level.

"Within SFL, Very Little Work Has Been Done On What Constitutes A Word"

Fontaine (2017: 9):

Within SFL, very little work has been done on what constitutes a word and it is often the case, as it is generally in linguistics, that the orthographic word is the default but this is problematic for a variety of reasons. The most important reason is because English orthography has not been consistent (into but out of, corkscrew but tea towel, etc.). Indeed, the very nature of what is a word cannot be taken for granted (see Wray 2014). The focus on the orthographic word is a real danger to studies of lexis and as corpus linguistics increases in popularity, it becomes even more important to challenge the assumptions surrounding the identification of lexical items. The status of the lexeme and indeed lexical representation within the theory is critically important, not just for the theory itself but for the areas it ventures into including applications and dialogue with other theories of language.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 568-9) are quite explicit:

The folk notion of the "word" is really a conflation of two different abstractions, one lexical and one grammatical.

(i) Vocabulary (lexis): the word as lexical item, or "lexeme". This is construed as an isolate, a 'thing' that can be counted and sorted in (alphabetical) order. People "look for" words, they "put thoughts into" them, "put them into" or "take them out of another's mouth", and nowadays they keep collections of words on their shelves or in their computers in the form of dictionaries. Specialist knowledge is thought of as a matter of terminology. The taxonomic organisation of vocabulary is less exposed: it is made explicit in Roget's Thesaurus, but is only implicit in a standard dictionary. Lexical taxonomy was the first area of language to be systematically studied by anthropologists, when they began to explore cultural knowledge as it is embodied in folk taxonomies of plants, animals, diseases and the like.

(ii) Grammar: the word as one of the ranks in the grammatical system. This is, not surprisingly, where Western linguistic theory as we know it today began in classical times, with the study of words varying in form according to their case, number, aspect, person etc.. Word-based systems such as these do provide a way in to studying grammatical semantics: but the meanings they construe are always more complex than the categories that appear as formal variants, and grammarians have had to become aware of covert patterns.

[2] To be clear, SFL Theory models linguistic phenomena 'from above'; that is, lexicogrammatical phenomena, such as words, are modelled in terms of the meaning they express. This is the direct opposite of viewing the word 'from below'; that is, in terms of how it is expressed (orthographically).

[3] As previously demonstrated, unknown to Fontaine, the status of the lexeme in SFL Theory is clearly defined, and the notion of lexical representation in a mental lexicon is inconsistent with both SFL Theory and, according to Edelman (1989: 228), 'the known facts of human biology and brain science'.

[4] To be clear, dialogue with other theories of language is dialogue with theories with different assumptions about language and how it is to be modelled.

"The Treatment Of Phrasal Verbs"

Fontaine (2017: 9):

As an example of the need for more explicitness on lexical representation, let’s consider the treatment of phrasal verbs, a type of multi-word expression (MWE), see Moon (1997) for a discussion of the many types of MWEs. Halliday and Matthiessen (2014:413) define them as “lexical verbs which consist of more than just the verb word itself”. 

Fawcett (2000) has a similar position but differs in how these forms are represented in the theory. He considers that the lexical items are effectively separate elements of the clause (i.e. main verb and main verb extension) but that these forms jointly realise the process. 

If phrasal verbs are single lexical items, although orthographically expressed as two, then they should be analysed in the same way as any other multi-morphemic lexical item, such as unhappiness or understand. 

The issue of their potential discontinuity is not necessarily a barrier to this approach. Evidence from neurolinguistics by Cappelle, Shtyrov & Pulvermuller (2010:200) supports the position “that language users store prefabricated chunks of lexical material which consist of more than one word and which can potentially be separated (e.g. heat the room up)”. If this is how these MWEs are stored, then grammatical description should reflect this and the theoretical framework should represent them as such. In other words, lexico-grammatical description should be, at least in part, based on (or include) what we know about the cognitive aspects involved, e.g. how linguistic items are stored.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, the notion of lexical representation in a mental lexicon is inconsistent with both SFL Theory (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999) and 'the known facts of human biology and brain science' (Edelman 1989: 228).

[2] To be clear, Halliday & Matthiessen's discussion of phrasal verbs is concerned with the word as grammatical unit — verb, preposition, adverb — not with the word as lexical item. Halliday and Matthiessen (2014: 413):

They are of two kinds, plus a third, which is a combination of the other two:

(i) verb + adverb, e.g. look out ‘unearth, retrieve’
(ii) verb + preposition, e.g. look for ‘seek’
(iii) verb + adverb + preposition, e.g. look out for ‘watch for the presence of’

[3] To be clear, Fawcett's 'main verb' and 'main verb extension' are concerned with the word as a grammatical constituent, not with the word as lexical item.

[4] To be clear, this is Halliday's model. Phrasal verbs realise the Process of a clause.

[5] To be clear, phrasal verbs are already modelled in SFL as single lexical items.

[6] To be clear, neurolinguistics and cognitive linguistics are founded on different assumptions about language which entail different approaches to modelling it. Importantly, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 595-9) analyse the model of cognitive science from the perspective of SFL Theory, showing, for example, how it reconstrues mental processes as material and relational processes.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 595-6):

Since figures of sensing are reified as participants, they can themselves be construed in participant roles. Here another feature of the folk model is taken oven its spatial metaphor is retained and further elaborated. Thus the mind is construed as a space where the metaphorical participants of sensing are involved in processes of doing & happening and of being & having: thoughts, concepts, memories, images are stored, located, retrieved, activated and so on.

"Making Lexical Representation In Terms Of A Mental Lexicon More Explicit In SFL"

Fontaine (2017: 8-9):

Cognitive studies, including evidence from psycholinguistics, seem unanimous in accepting the need for a mental lexicon and one that plays an important role in both language production and language understanding according to Butler (2009:59). He goes on to say that “in language production the activation of an item from the lexicon must be accompanied, or at least closely followed, by the pairing of that item with a syntactic configuration which, in combination with the lexical item, begins to realise the conceptual structure being expressed. This is clearly easier in a model which contains a lexicon than in one which does not” (ibid.). The question remains then whether something could be gained (or lost) by making lexical representation in terms of a mental lexicon more explicit in SFL.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, evidence from other theories, with different theoretical assumptions, is not evidence for what is needed in SFL Theory. Moreover, SFL Theory already demonstrates that lexicogrammar can be modelled without resorting to a mental lexicon. More importantly, as neuroscientist Gerald Edelman (1989: 228) has demonstrated, the notion of lexical representations in a mental lexicon is inconsistent with 'the known facts of human biology and brain science'.

[2] To be clear, this is an instance of the logical fallacy known as 'begging the question' (petitio principii):

In classical rhetoric and logic, begging the question is an informal fallacy that occurs when an argument's premises assume the truth of the conclusion, instead of supporting it. It is a type of circular reasoning: an argument that requires that the desired conclusion be true.

Butler assumes language production involves a lexicon in which items are activated, and concludes that a model of language production requires the inclusion of a lexicon.

[3] To be clear, this question does not "remain". Because 'lexical representation in terms of a mental lexicon' is inconsistent with SFL Theory, introducing it into SFL Theory necessarily results in a loss of theoretical consistency.

"The Lexical Items Must Be Somewhere"

Fontaine (2017: 8):

However, these positions are not necessarily entirely opposing. Butler (2009:59) suggests that “since a lexical item is defined by the selection expression through which it is generated, it could be claimed that there is in effect a kind of lexicon, and furthermore that the realisation statements attached to networks will specify the syntactic patterns associated with lexical items”. In this sense, there may need to be some kind of lexicon, a large, complex network of lexical entries (however they are defined). The lexical items must be somewhere and must be accounted for somehow in the model. It is perhaps worth noting that Fawcett (1994, 2014) describes modelling nouns in the computational implementation of his model of SFL. The representation is in the form of an ontological network but there is no examination of the nature of the lexical item itself, i.e. in terms of its form(s) and functions or its semantic properties. Due to limitations of space, a full discussion of this is not possible here. On the issue of lexis discussed at this point, Fawcett concludes that “Halliday’s original 1961 insight was well-founded, the only major modification needed being that lexically realised meanings are not necessarily most delicate’, in the sense of ‘at or near the terminal leaves of the system network” (1994:79).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, lexical items are accounted for, but they are not accounted for by a lexicon. Instead, lexical items are accounted for by the system networks of the lexicogrammatical stratum, whose most delicate features are synthetically realised by lexical items.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, features in networks are explanatory, not ontological; or as Halliday (2003 [1992]: 200) puts it:

They are not "reified": that is, they are not endowed with a spurious reality of their own.

Hunston and Francis Misunderstanding 'Lexis As Most Delicate Grammar'

Fontaine (2017: 8):

One interpretation of lexis as most delicate grammar is that they are somehow the end point of a bundle of system choices, which leads to a single lexical option. Hunston and Francis (2000:28) argue against this view:

If words have their typical phraseologies, such that words are not selected in isolation but in variable phrases, then it is unsatisfactory to propose that each lexical item is the end-point of an individual bundle of systemic choices. The best compromise that could be reached would be to propose that each bundle of system choices should end, not in a lexical item per se but in a ‘unit of meaning’. As units of meaning are, by their nature, indeterminate in extent, however, such an interpretation would involve system-choices leading to fuzzy-edged and overlapping units, at best.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is a serious misunderstanding of SFL Theory. To be clear, the specification of lexical items by bundles of the most delicate lexicogrammatical features does not entail that words are selected in isolation. Grammatically, words serve as functions in group and phrase structures, and so they are selected with other words in those structures. Lexically, words have co-occurrence tendencies, and these collocations are modelled in SFL Theory as serving a cohesive function.

[2] Again, this is a serious misunderstanding of SFL Theory. To be clear,  in SFL Theory, lexicogrammar (wording) is modelled in terms of the meaning it realises. That is, the lexicogrammatical features that specify lexical items are modelled in terms of meaning.

[3] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL Theory, units of meaning are not "by their very nature, indeterminate in extent". For example, the "units" of ideational meaning are the three types of phenomenon: sequence, figure, and element, which are congruently realised in wording as clause complex, clause and group/phrase, respectively (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 49). Their realisation in wording delimits, and so determines, the extent of each unit of meaning.

"The Question About Where The Lexical Items Are"

Fontaine (2017: 7-8):

It is often assumed that as the system networks become more delicate in terms of systemic choice, we find lexis in the most delicate systems. However, this is problematic in a number of ways. It is difficult to see how a lexeme could be represented as a choice in the system networks (although see Fawcett, 1994). The term ‘lexeme’ is used here in contrast to ‘lexical item’ in order to distinguish between an abstract entry in the mental lexicon (lexeme) and an instance of a lexeme in use (lexical item). However, the question is whether SFL needs to model lexemes or not. Questions of lexical representation have not been explicitly explored in detail, although Tucker’s work (1996, 1998, 2006, 2009) comes very close. The position of lexis in Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) is, theoretically, fully integrated into the grammar if we accept the theory’s assumption that “there is no need to postulate a separate ‘lexicon’ as a pre-existing entity on which the grammar is made to operate” (Halliday and Matthiessen, 1999: 199). If this is the case, it leaves open the question about where the lexical items are. One interpretation of lexis as most delicate grammar is that they are somehow the end point of a bundle of system choices, which leads to a single lexical option.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This unsourced assumption is misleading. To be clear, in SFL Theory, we do not "find lexis in the most delicate systems" and a lexical item is not "a choice in the system networks". Instead, different bundles of features of the most delicate systems specify different lexical items. That is, a lexical item and the features that specify it are different levels of symbolic abstraction: with lexical item as Token and its features as Value.

[2] This confirms that Fontaine assumes a mental lexicon of lexical representations, which, as previously explained, is inconsistent with both SFL Theory and the known facts of human biology and brain science.

[3] This interpretation (by Hunston & Francis 2000) is misleading. To be clear, lexical items are not "the end point of a bundle of system choices which leads to a single lexical option"; see [1] above. The "end points" in systems are the features that are conjointly realised by lexical items.

"A Lexical Entry In The Lexicon"

Fontaine (2017: 7):

While the approaches to lexis mentioned above certainly offer important insights to our understanding of lexis and lexico-grammar, they generally do not discuss in detail issues related to lexical representation or provide an account of what might be needed in terms of a lexical entry in the lexicon. As Martin (2016:45) points out:

Firth's interest in collocation (‘the company words keep’) has been developed in corpus linguistic research – chiefly by Sinclair and his colleagues (e.g. 1966; 1991) but less so in SFL where Halliday's early acknowledgement of the distinction between words and lexical items and the need for a syntagmatic perspective on expectancy relations among lexical items has tended to be backgrounded in relation to an interest in lexis as delicate grammar (the ‘grammarian's dream’, pursued by Hasan, and others).

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, the notion of lexical representation in a mental lexicon is inconsistent with SFL Theory and, as the neuroscientist Edelman (1989: 228) points out, with 'the known facts of human biology and brain science'. The first of these inconsistencies, at least, accounts for the lack of discussion of such matters in SFL approaches to lexis.

[2] To be clear, the quote from Martin (2016) has no bearing on lexical representation or lexical entries in "the" lexicon; see further below.

[3] Martin's proposition can be analysed as follows:

Halliday's early acknowledgement of the distinction between words and lexical items and the need for a syntagmatic perspective on expectancy relations among lexical items	has	tended to be backgrounded	in relation to an interest in lexis as delicate grammar
Subject	Finite	Predicator	Adjunct
Mood		Residue

To be clear, neither (i) the 'distinction of words and lexical items' nor (ii) 'expectancy relations among lexical items' are "backgrounded in relation to" lexis as most delicate grammar, because both are aspects of 'lexis as most delicate grammar'.

Firstly, 'lexis as most delicate grammar' means that lexical items are theorised as the synthetic realisation of the most delicate lexicogrammatical features. Secondly, the 'distinction of words and lexical items' distinguishes this view of lexis from the word as a grammatical rank, where it is the entry condition to grammatical systems. Thirdly, 'expectancy relations between lexical items' is the syntagmatic dimension of 'lexis as most delicate grammar', collocation, which is exploited to create textual cohesion.

Mistaking Grammatical Words For Lexical Items

Fontaine (2017: 7):

It is also worth mentioning work done on lexis within an SFL framework on verb sense classification. For example, Matthiessen (2014) and Thompson (2015) have both offered advances on lexical issues within transitivity. Discussions of transitivity configurations in SFL come very close to describing lexical representation for a given verb is typically the case in other approaches to transitivity. Finally, while there is no space here to discuss lexical modelling in computational approaches within SFL, it is worth noting very briefly work done by Fawcett, Tucker, and Lin, 1993; Fawcett, 1994; Matthiessen and Bateman, 1991; and O'Donnell, Cheng and Hitzeman, 1998 to name only a few. One important insight coming out of this work suggests there is a need for lexical representation of one kind or another, at least for computational applications.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here Fontaine confuses word as lexical item with word as grammatical rank unit. The verb is a class of grammatical unit, and discussions of verbs in relation to experiential grammar (transitivity) are discussions of the verb as a constituent of the verbal group realising the clause function: Process. Lexical items, on the other hand, are the synthetic realisation of a bundle of the most delicate lexicogrammatical features — analogous to the phoneme /b/ being the synthetic realisation of the feature bundle [voiced, bilabial, stop].

[2] To be clear, the need for lexical representation is not an "important insight" coming out of this work, because the notion of lexical representation, which assumes a mental lexicon, is inconsistent with both SFL Theory and the known facts of human biology and brain science, as previously noted.

"Martin’s (1992) Work In This Area Is Noteworthy"

Fontaine (2017: 7):

Martin’s (1992) work in this area is noteworthy, in particular chapter five in English Text draws out some important issues and offers a very useful overview of how lexical relations can be approached within SFL. In particular, he discusses very well the “problem of units” (1992:290), which raises important questions about lexical representation. Indeed, as I do here, he asks how we can define lexical items. Interestingly, he proposes an alternative, suggesting it would be fruitful to “turn to the level of context” (p.291) and he shows that it is, but his interests and the types of questions he seeks to address lead the discussion towards register variables. This is not in any way a criticism since this perspective brings with it important insights. However it nevertheless remains concentrated on system networks and therefore the dimension of delicacy. Most approaches to lexis within SFL adhere to the dimension of delicacy. Martin (2016: 46-47) points out important contributions to studies of lexis in the area of phraseology, e.g. Tucker (2006) and Bednarek (e.g. 2008), where the focus is on corpus-based approaches to lexis; both make significant contributions to phraseology.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. Martin (1992) is a rebranding of Halliday & Hasan's (1976) lexicogrammatical cohesion as Martin's model of discourse semantics (evidence here), with his Chapter 5 being his rebranding of their lexical cohesion as his experiential system of IDEATION (evidence here). Halliday & Hasan's lexical cohesion is not so much concerned with lexical relations, but with how relations between lexical items can be used to create textual cohesion.

[2] To be clear, Martin's discussion is concerned with the problem of 'semantic units' (p290), and the unit he comes up with is a 'message part' (p293), which 'may or may not be realised by a single lexical item' (p293).

[3] To be clear, Martin's discussion of his semantic unit, the message part, does not raise important questions about lexical representation, even if the notion of lexical representation in a mental lexicon were consistent with SFL Theory and the known facts of human biology and brain science.

[4] To be clear, Martin's discussion of the problem of delimiting lexical items (p290-1) takes the syntagmatic perspective of collocation, instead of the paradigmatic perspective of agnation. Systemically, the argument for a lexical item involves providing evidence that the wording in question can be replaced by a single lexical item.

[5] To be clear, Martin (1992) misunderstands the SFL notion of context, confusing it with varieties of language: genre and register (evidence here). In Hjelmslevian terms, he mistakes varieties of a denotative semiotic for the content plane of a connotative semiotic. Because of these misunderstandings, Martin's discussion is neither fruitful nor insightful.

[6] Here Fontaine misunderstands Martin's text. To be clear, what Martin purports to be doing is using field, the ideational dimension of context, which Martin mistakes as a register variable, to 'set up' his experiential semantic unit 'message part'.

[7] To be clear, there are two reasons why approaches to lexis in Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory remain "concentrated" on system networks. The first is that the system network is the formalism for representing language as meaning potential. The second is that SFL defines lexis as most delicate grammar.

"On What Basis Is There A Lexical Tie Between Two Items" In Lexical Cohesion

Fontaine (2017: 6-7):

There are several research topics in SFL that do come close to a lexicological perspective. The first will be obvious to those familiar with the work. Cohesion in English (Halliday and Hasan, 1976) is the greatest contribution so far in terms of developing an approach to lexicology in SFL. This seminal work was ahead of its time when first published and remains an important source in any work related to cohesion. While it moved the field forward and was in many respects “ahead of its time” (Sanders and Maat, 2006:592), it does not address issues of concern to lexicologists. For example, on what basis is there a lexical tie between two items, i.e. what is the nature of the relationship? In some cases, lexical cohesion relies on an assumption that “a shared lexico-semantic relationship holds” (ibid.:591). This suggests that, for lexicologists, a more detailed account of lexical representation is needed for the SFL account of lexical relations to be more robust and usable in other approaches.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday & Hasan (1976) is not a contribution to developing an approach to lexicology in SFL Theory, since the theoretical assumptions that define lexicology as a field are inconsistent with the theoretical assumptions of SFL Theory.

[2] This is misleading, because the types of relations between lexical items in a cohesive tie are explicitly stated in Halliday & Hasan (1976: 288) as reiteration (repetition, synonym, superordinate, general word) or collocation:

Moreover, the model has since been made more explicit in terms of axis and logical and experiential relations. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 644):

[3] On the contrary, what this suggests is that the cognitive linguists, Sanders and Maat, have a very superficial acquaintance with the work they regard as "ahead of its time". Moreover, as previously explained, the notion of 'lexical representation' in a mental lexicon is inconsistent with both SFL Theory and 'the known facts of human biology and brain science' (Edelman 1989).

"The Disambiguation Of Word Senses"

Fontaine (2017: 6):

Lexicology concerns the study of words and their semantics, morphology, development and lexical representation, including word formation processes and the various types of relations among words. Context will be significant to lexical studies in different ways depending on the area of interest. For example, research into word histories requires a historical context, a diachronic perspective, often referred to as phylogenesis, and work related to the disambiguation of word senses involves context of situation and collocation. Areas that do not tend to overlap with SFL include lexical representation (i.e. what is its semantic nature and how is it represented) which covers morphology, semantics and lexical relations.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, lexicology is a field within linguistics, defined by specific theoretical assumptions, rather than a theory of language. Moreover, there are different theoretical approaches to lexicology. As will be seen, the theoretical assumptions that distinguish lexicology as a field of study are inconsistent with the theoretical assumptions of SFL Theory.

[2] As previously explained, the notion of lexical representation assumes a mental lexicon, and is inconsistent with both SFL Theory and 'the known facts of human biology and brain science' (Edelman 1989: 228).

[3] To be clear, in terms of SFL Theory, this confuses context, the culture as semiotic system, with phylogenesis, the evolution of the system in the species.

[4] To be clear, the notion of 'disambiguating word senses' takes a 'bottom-up' perspective on language, which is the direct opposite of the 'top-down' perspective taken by SFL Theory. That is, it begins with the word as form, and asks what meaning it expresses in a particular instantiation, whereas SFL begins with the meaning, and asks how the meaning is expressed.

"Meaning Potential Is Construed By Systems Of Language Choice"

Fontaine (2017: 6):

The relationship between context and lexicogrammatical systems is still being developed within SFL. For the position taken in this paper, the relationship of instantiation may provide one way to develop an account of lexical representation within the framework. The concept of construal is also significant. Halliday (1991:282) explains that “the culture is construed by systems of language choice; the situation is construed by patterns of language use”. Based on Fig. 2, this statement can be rephrased in more abstract general terms as follows: the meaning potential is construed by systems of language choice; the instance is construed by patterns of language use. This is a point we will come back to in the next section when considering meaning potential and instance in terms of lexical representation.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. In SFL Theory, the "relationship between context and lexicogrammar" is precisely specified, as the relation between levels in a hierarchy of symbolic abstraction: realisation (elaborating identification). On this model, taking metaredundancy into account, context is realised by the realisation of semantics in lexicogrammar.

[2] To be clear, the "relationship of instantiation" is the relation between potential and instance at a given level of symbolic abstraction. As such, this says nothing about relations between different levels of abstraction, such as context and lexicogrammar.

[3] As previously explained, the notion of lexical representation, which assumes a mental lexicon, is inconsistent with both SFL Theory and 'the known facts of human biology and brain science' (Edelman: 1989: 152, 228, 234).

[4] To be clear, by 'construal' Halliday means 'intellectual construction', and the meaning of the Halliday quote is that culture (context as potential) is an intellectual construction of systems of language (language as potential) and situation (context as instance) is an intellectual construction of patterns of language use (language as instance). That is, Halliday here relates context to language at the two poles of the cline of instantiation.

[5] This seriously misunderstands the Halliday quote. Fontaine's interpretation is that language as potential ('meaning potential') is an intellectual construction of language as potential ('systems of language choice') and that language as instance ('the instance') is an intellectual construction of language as instance ('patterns of language use'). That is, Fontaine's tautological gloss omits Halliday's crucial point that context is an intellectual construction of language.

"Frequency (Often Described As Probability In SFL)"

Fontaine (2017: 5-6):

According to Hasan (2009:169), “instantiation is the relationship between a potential and its instance, context of culture is the potential, i.e. the system, while context of situation is an instance of that potential”. The role of frequency (often described as probability in SFL) is important to the understanding of system and instantiation since it has a mediating role between system and instance. In theory, every instance perturbs the system to some degree or another, however (in)significant this may be. Plum (1998:31) states that the premise that “the realisation of context in text is probabilistic provides not only the key to making the hypothesis of the functional determination of text by its context testable but also provides a way of accounting for the variability found in text”. This is a now common view within SFL but it leads to viewing lexis or at least lexicogrammatical structure as deterministic. It is at some level difficult to reconcile this view with Halliday’s (1991:282) claim that “text and situation come into being together; so whatever kind of order we set up between them, it must be such that we can start from either end”. One way to view this relationship is to consider, as suggested by Tucker (2006:960), that “the full potential of language is reduced under the influence of the context of culture and the context of situation”, which maintains the relationship between meaning potential and instance.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. To be clear, in SFL Theory, there is an important difference between probability and frequency. Probability quantifies the features of potential, whereas frequency quantifies the features of an instance. Frequencies of features instantiated as text eventually have the effect of changing their systemic probability of being instantiated.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. On the one hand, probabilistic instantiation is not deterministic, because it introduces a degree of uncertainty — and so indeterminacy — into the system–&–process. On the other hand, there is no deterministic relation between context and language, because the relation between them is realisation (elaborating identification), not cause (enhancing identification).

[3] To be clear, the Tucker quote is potentially misleading, because the "full potential of language" is not reduced under the influence of the context of culture, since the context of culture is the "full potential" of context which is realised by the "full potential" of language.

What is true is that less and less of the "full potential" (of culture and language) is instantiated as our perspective descends the cline of instantiation. That is, the potential of a register is less than the overall potential of a language, and the potential instantiated as text is less than the potential of its register.

However, contrary to Fontaine's claim, the Tucker quote has no bearing whatsoever on any supposed determinism in instantiation or lexis or grammatical structure.

"The Relationship Of Context And Language Through Instantiation"

Fontaine (2017: 5, 6):

The relationship of context and language through realisation and instantiation is shown in Fig. 2, taken from Halliday (1991).

Matthiessen (2015:34) explains that in Fig. 2, “situation type has the same location as context of culture (and context of situation) in terms of the hierarchy of stratification, but they are instead differentiated in terms of the cline of instantiation: context of culture is located at the potential pole, context of situation at the instance pole”.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, context and language are related by realisation, but not through instantiation, which is the relation between potential and instance, as Figure 2 illustrates.

[2] To be clear, this figure, adapted from Halliday, is potentially misleading, since it locates different perspectives of the same mid-point on the cline of instantiation as different locations on the cline of instantiation.

That is, cultural domain and situation type are not different points on the cline of instantiation, they are different perspectives on the same point: cultural domain takes the perspective of the potential pole of the cline of instantiation, whereas situation type takes the perspective of the instance pole of the cline of instantiation.

Likewise, register and text type are not different points on the cline of instantiation, they are different perspectives on the same point: register takes the perspective of the potential pole of the cline of instantiation, whereas text type takes the perspective of the instance pole of the cline of instantiation.

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 384):

Fontaine's Notion That Context of Culture "Captures" The Potential Of Language

Fontaine (2017: 5):

The difference between context of culture and context of situation according to Halliday (1991) is one of perspective; this difference is not meant to suggest different objects of study. Halliday (1991:276) explains this as follows:

These also are not two different things; they are the same thing seen from different points of view. A situation, as we are envisaging it, is simply an instance of culture; or, to put it the other way round, a culture is the potential behind all the different types of situation that occur. 

Context of culture differs in its relationship to language since it is not tied to a context of situation through text but rather captures its potential. According to Halliday and Matthiessen (2014:32), “a given language is thus interpreted by reference to its semiotic habitat”.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the relation between these two perspectives, context of culture (potential) and context of situation (instance) is instantiation.

[2] The claim here seems to be:

• Context of culture differs from context of situation in its relationship to language 
• because 
• context of culture is not tied to a context of situation through text 
• but rather context of culture captures language's potential

To be clear, relations between context and language do not involve notions of "capturing" or "tying". Context is related to language stratally, by realisation, whereas culture and language (potential) are related to situation and text (instance) by instantiation.

[3] To be clear, as this quote makes explicit, the context ("habitat") of language is semiotic, not material.

Fontaine's Claim That Context Of Situation Is Effectively The Collection Of "Instances Of Text"

Fontaine (2017: 4-5):

Context itself is not ‘out there’ as in outside the speaker. While it might be considered to be outside the language system, it cannot be denied that whatever context is, it is connected to or can interact with the language system. Halliday (1991:281) explains the connection as follows:

How do you set about “creating” a context for language? You cannot do it by means of legislation, like decreeing that poems are to be written in praise of a national leader. The only way is for the text itself to create its own context of situation.

This suggests that textual, i.e. linguistic, features are meaningful and that context of situation is effectively the collection of instances of text. Halliday (1991:277) sees this context as “a theoretical construct for explaining how a text relates to the social processes within which it is located”. It is well established in SFL literature that this construct involves three variables or components, commonly termed Field, Tenor and Mode of Discourse, respectively as “the underlying social activity, the persons or “voices” involved in that activity, and the particular functions accorded to the text within it” (ibid.).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, context does not "interact" with language, because they are distinct levels of symbolic abstraction, not modules at the same level of abstraction. The "connection" between context and language is thus the relation between levels of symbolic abstraction: realisation.

[2] To be clear, the Halliday quote relates an instance of language (text) to an instance of context (situation). The point is that, because language realises context, an instance of language "creates" an instance of context.

[3] To be clear, the Halliday quote does not suggest that the linguistic features instantiated as text are meaningful; see [2] above. Since SFL Theory models language as meaning potential, this is a given.

[4] To be clear, the Halliday quote does not suggest that an instance of context (situation) is "the collection of instances of text"; see [2] above. On the one hand, the relation between context and language is realisation (elaborating identification), not composition (extending identification or ascription); see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 145-6). On the other hand, the wording "instances of text" misunderstands instantiation, according to which a text is an instance of language.

Fontaine's Claim That She Is Using Halliday's Model

Fontaine (2017: 4):

In this paper, the conceptualisation of context is taken primarily from Halliday (1991), see Hasan (2009) which examines the place of context in the SFL framework, including an excellent discussion of Halliday’s 1991 view of context and language.

The two aspects of context are explained by Halliday (1991: 271) as follows:

Language considered as a system – its lexical items and grammatical categories – is to be related to its context of culture; while instances of language in use – specific texts and their component parts – are to be related to their context of situation. Both these contexts are of course outside of language itself.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. By 'context' Halliday means the culture as semiotic system. Fontaine has already demonstrated (p3) that she misunderstands context as language, co-text, on the one hand, and as the material environment of a text, on the other. It is this claim that Fontaine is using Halliday's model that justifies critiquing her paper in terms of Halliday's model.

[2] To be clear, the two "aspects" of context are the two poles of the cline of instantiation on that stratum: potential (culture) and instance (situation).

"Two Strata Of Context: Culture And Situation"

Fontaine (2017: 4):

Bartlett (2017: 375) explains context as “a unifying element within the overall architecture of SFL, linking language as system and instance (langue and parole) to the material conditions of those who use it”. However, its definition and place within the theory is interpreted somewhat differently by different scholars (see for example Martin (1992), Butt et al. (2000), Matthiessen (2015), Wegener (2011), Bartlett (2017) and contributions by various authors in Fontaine et al., (2013), especially Bartlett (2013) and Bowcher (2013), to name only a few. At a more abstract level there is general agreement concerning some key points, including for example that context is accounted for by stratification and instantiation; that “[i]n exploring contextual and linguistic patterns in systemic functional linguistics, we try to interpret them in terms of dimensions” (Matthiessen, 2015:32) and that there are at least two strata of context, culture and situation. A full review of these positions is beyond the scope of this paper but see Bartlett (2017) for an overview of context.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it seriously misunderstands the SFL notion of 'context'. Context is neither a "unifying element" nor a link to "the material conditions of those who use it". On the one hand, context is but one level of symbolic abstraction (stratum) in the overall architecture of SFL Theory. On the other hand, and more importantly, context is semiotic — metaphenomenonal — the culture as semiotic system, not material — phenomenal — the perceptual field of speaker and addressee.

[2] To be clear, the model of context in Martin (1992) is inconsistent with both SFL Theory and itself, as demonstrated in meticulous detail here. For example, Martin equates context-as-potential (culture) with varieties of language (genre), and context-as-instance (situation) with varieties of language (register) and mistakes the instantiation relation between them as symbolic abstraction (stratification), such that context is constituted by varieties of language (genre) realised by varieties of language (register). In Hjelmslevian terms, Martin mistakes varieties of a denotative semiotic for the content plane of a connotative semiotic.

[3] To be clear, theoretical consistency is not a matter of scholars agreeing, but their work "agreeing" with theory. The unreliability of interpersonal agreement is humorously captured by the following B Kliban cartoon:

[4] To be clear, here Fontaine misunderstands the relation between culture (potential) and situation (instance) as realisation (stratified symbolic abstraction) instead of instantiation.

"The Need To Develop Lexical Representation Within SFL"

Fontaine (2017: 4):

In this section, I will first briefly outline the view of context taken in this paper and in the process draw on the key aspects for discussing the need to develop lexical representation within SFL.

Context is a specialised term in SFL, a theoretical metaphor, like the term 'choice', among others. Hasan (2013:298) argues that “[t]hese theoretical metaphors enable the analyst to enter into an explicit discourse on how language as a semiotic system becomes a powerful resource for the exchange of meanings in social contexts”. By expanding context, as a theoretical metaphor, we can enable some important developments in terms of an SFL approach to lexicology or what we might simply call lexical representation.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as already explained here, the notion of 'lexical representation' — the representation of words in a mental lexicon — is inconsistent with both SFL Theory and 'the known facts of human biology and brain science' (Edelman 1989: 152, 228, 234).

[2] To be clear, in order to expand the SFL notion of 'context' in a theoretically consistent way, it is first necessary to understand the SFL notion of 'context'. As already demonstrated, this is not the case here.

"The SFL Conceptualisation Of Context"

Fontaine (2017: 4):

The other part of the meaning of ‘putting lexicology into context’ concerns how lexicology can be viewed in relation to context, without restricting the notion of context to co-text or collocation. Normally SFL linguists interested in context and lexicologists generally are almost worlds apart. As suggested above, these are two perspectives that in many ways seem too distant to be merged. Certainly we do find research on context that relates to lexis and lexical analysis but this is not usually framed in lexicological terms which would be accessible to lexicologists. Similarly, it is true that lexicologists are increasingly interested in context (moving beyond co-text) but they do not generally adopt the SFL conceptualisation of context.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misunderstands the 'SFL conceptualisation of context', which does not include either co-text or collocation. To be clear, in SFL Theory, the term 'context' refers to the culture modelled as a semiotic system. On the other hand, the terms 'co-text' and 'collocation' refer to language, not context. The term 'co-text' refers to (a complementary portion of) an instance of language, whereas 'collocation' refers to the syntagmatic dimension of lexis, analogous to structure in the grammar.

[2] Interest in context and interest in lexicology are not two different perspectives on the same phenomenon, but interests in two different phenomena: culture and words, respectively.

[3] To be clear, as already demonstrated, Fontaine, also, does not adopt the 'SFL conceptualisation of context'.

Fontaine's Crucial Misunderstanding Of Halliday's Notion Of Context

Fontaine (2017: 3-4):

Putting lexicology into context 

There is a deliberate play on words in the heading for this section. One part of the meaning relates to the frame, PUT X INTO CONTEXT, which means that X is given with the textual and/or situational context in which it was produced, i.e. provides more information so that X can be better understood. There is another related expression to this one, TAKE X OUT OF CONTEXT, which means that X has been removed from the textual and/or situational context in which it was produced, i.e. information is missing which makes understanding flawed in some way. In these two everyday expressions, we get a sense of what context suggests to most people and that is meaning or at least meaningful information. Context is where we ‘get’ meaning but it is also a kind of meaning, or rather kinds of meanings. In SFL terms, context “is that which helps determine meaning. This includes the surrounding text and the surrounding circumstances whatever they may be” (Wegener, 2011:4–5). The concept of meaning within SFL stems from Firth (1957), who saw meaning as function in context. For Halliday meaning is best viewed as ‘choice’ (Halliday, 2013), which he sees as an extension of Saussur[e]an paradigmatic relations (Ibid.: 16).

Blogger Comments:

This misrepresents the SFL notion of context. To be clear, 

• context is the culture modelled as a semiotic system; it is modelled as a higher level of symbolic abstraction than language;
• the surrounding text, the co-text, is (an instance of) language, not context; and
• the surrounding circumstances of a text, in the sense of the material environment of a text, is the perceptual field of the speaker.

The context (and co-text) of a text and the environment of a text differ in terms of order of experience. The context of a text, a situation, is second-order (semiotic) experience, since it is construed by the language of a text that is projected by a speaker. The environment of a text, on the other hand, is first-order (material) experience. Where the semiotic context of a text is metaphenomenal, the material environment of a text is phenomenal.