"It Is Not Yet Clear That System Networks Are Appropriate For The Analyst Or The Understander"

Fontaine (2017: 14):

There is often a conflict for the analyst when trying to determine what the speaker has done with language and how the model used by the analyst can fit the instances of language being analysed. The speaker is generating language, while the analyst is parsing language, and doing so for very different reasons. In psycholinguistics, the problem of viewing these two processes (production vs understanding) as separate process is referred to by Pickering and Garrod (2013:347) as “the ‘cognitive sandwich’, a perspective that is incompatible both with the demands of communication and with extensive data indicating that production and comprehension are tightly interwoven”. Reconciling the role of language producer and language understander is important for many reasons, not least of which is the development of a better tool for text analysis. Since it is not yet clear that the system networks are appropriate for the analyst or for the understander, as noted by Tucker (2009:424) above, this development is needed for those using the framework for analysis.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, this passage is irrelevant and unconnected to all that has been previously written in this paper.

[1] To be clear, there is no conflict here, because the theory is a model of the language that is used in both speaking and analysing. The different purposes of the speaker and analyst have no impact on the language of the speaker that the analyst is "parsing".

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, system networks are as "appropriate" for the "understander" and the analyst as they are for the speaker. In logogenesis, the speaker produces an instance of the system, a text, and the "understander" and the analyst relate the instance to the system. Halliday (2008: 192):

The system and the text are not two different phenomena: what we call the “system” of a language is equivalent to its “text potential”. Analysing discourse means, first and foremost, relating the text to the potential that lies behind it.

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 384):

If we look at logogenesis from the point of view of the system (rather than from the point of view of each instance), we can see that logogenesis builds up a version of the system that is particular to the text being generated: the speaker/writer uses this changing system as a resource in creating the text; and the listener/reader has to reconstruct something like that system in the process of interpreting the text — with the changing system as a resource for the process of interpretation. We can call this an instantial system.

[3] Trivially, this was not noted above.

"The Relationship Between Lexis And Grammar Cannot Be Denied"

Fontaine (2017: 14):

In this paper, I set out to examine the relationship between context and lexicology. The way SFL talks about context is surprisingly similar to the way lexicologists talk about lexis. To date, very little attention has been given to developing an approach to lexical representation in SFL. This seems to be related to the top-down approach to lexico-grammar and to the view of lexis as most delicate grammar. The relationship between lexis and grammar cannot be denied, however some work from the bottom-up may contribute significantly to improving the overall account of the lexico-grammar.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, context is the culture modelled as a semiotic system, whereas lexicology is a subfield of linguistics. Fontaine has not examined the relationship between culture and that subfield of linguistics in this paper; but see [2].

[2] To be clear, here Fontaine is referring to the distinction of potential and instance in SFL Theory and the lexical analysis of Hanks (2013). By singling out context in the SFL model, Fontaine again confirms that she does not understand that instantiation applies to all the strata of language, as well as context, despite the fact that Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 both represent this dimension of the theory explicitly.

[3] To be clear, the reason why there has been no attention to lexical representation in SFL Theory is that the notion of lexical representation in a mental lexicon is inconsistent with both SFL Theory and 'the known facts of human biology and brain science' (Edelman 1989: 228). In SFL Theory, it is the lexical items that are the representations, since they are realisations of bundles of the most delicate lexicogrammatical features.

[4] To be clear, it is not the case that "the relationship and grammar cannot be denied", but that, in a theory that models language in terms of lexis and grammar — rather than, say, lexicon and syntax — the relation between the two is established by the assumptions and mode of inquiry of the theory.

[5] To be clear, the view of lexis 'from below' identifies words with their forms, whereas the view 'from above' identifies words with the their functions. This is why a genuinely functional approach, like Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, takes the view 'from above'.

"This Proposal Would Have To Be Examined And Evaluated"

Fontaine (2017: 13-4):

Such an approach might open up the theory of SFL to more lexicological concerns and potentially address both diachronic perspectives as well as the fluidity, flexibility and indeterminacy that we find in language. This proposal is only tentative and it would have to be examined and evaluated to see whether the modelling of lexis in terms of context as suggested here may offer opportunities to account for shifting lexico-semantics. For example, according to García Velasco (2016: 940-941) “[usage] patterns may be modified or updated on the basis of new uses of the lexeme in different contexts. Meaning construction and sense modification is thus understood as the joint and cooperative activity of language users in verbal interaction”. Context of culture and context of situation play an important role in this. 

The individual lexemes of the language constitute a semiotic repertoire that is available to the speaker and this must allow for innovative, meaning creating uses, or exploitations in Hanks’ (2013) terminology.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Fontaine's proposal is to apply the cline of instantiation to lexis, using the terms 'lexeme' for potential and 'lexical item' for instance. Unknown to Fontaine, this is already part of the architecture of SFL Theory, since instantiation applies to all strata, including the lexicogrammatical systems whose most delicate features are synthetically realised by lexical items.

[2] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, Fontaine is not "modelling lexis in terms of context". The claim seems to rest on the misunderstanding that instantiation applies only to context, which suggests a misunderstanding of the theoretical dimensions depicted in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3.

[3] To be clear, since Fontaine's proposal is already part of SFL Theory, it does not offer anything that the theory does not already offer.

[4] To be clear, this is already modelled by SFL Theory in terms of instantiation, where changes in instance frequencies have the effect of changing system probabilities.

Lexis As Most Local Context

Fontaine (2017: 13):

At this point it is useful to return to the concepts discussed above in relation to context. The question now is whether lexis can be said to be distributed within the SFL model in a similar way to context. If we accept that the meaning potential is construed by systems of language choice; the instance is construed by patterns of language use, then we might be willing to consider that the lexical item (instance) is construed by patterns of use and that the lexeme (meaning potential) is construed by systems of lexico-grammar. This does not imply that lexis is separate from lexico-grammar. The idea of meaning potential in terms of the lexeme is not far from Halliday and Matthiessen’s view of items: “[t]he class of an item indicates in a general way its potential range of grammatical functions” (2014:76). If we are willing to entertain this idea as a proposal then it would suggest that rather than thinking of lexis only as most delicate grammar, we can think of lexis as most local context. This suggestion is illustrated in Fig. 3 below, which includes Halliday’s (1991) diagram of language and context. The dotted line in the figure indicates that the proposal here concerns primarily the horizontal relation of instantiation but it is unclear at this point how this can be integrated into the vertical relation of realisation, especially in terms of the lexico-grammar systems.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, this paragraph and diagram constitute the theoretical proposal of this paper.

[1] To be clear, context is not "distributed within the SFL model". Context is the culture modelled as a semiotic system and constitutes one stratum in the theoretical architecture. It would appear that  by "distributed", Fontaine means the cline of instantiation on this stratum. But since instantiation applies to all strata, singling out context suggests that Fontaine does not understand that instantiation applies to language as well as context — despite the representations in Figures 2 and 3.

[2] To be clear, the wording "if we accept that" presents the application of instantiation to language (that follows) as if it were Fontaine's idea, established in this paper, rather than a dimension of SFL Theory devised by Halliday.

[3] To be clear, this is a very confused rendering of instantiation. Systems of language choice are the theoretical means of representing language as meaning potential. Patterns of language use do not "construe" the instance; patterns of language use are patterns of instances, and so represent a move up the cline of instantiation from the instance pole (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 659).

[4] To be clear, the wording "we might be willing to consider that" presents the application of instantiation to lexis (that follows) as if it were Fontaine's idea, established in this paper, rather than a dimension of SFL Theory devised by Halliday.

[5] To be clear, this is a very confused rendering of instantiation as applied to lexis. Patterns of use do not "construe" the lexical item as instance; patterns of use are patterns of instances, and so represent a move up the cline of instantiation from the instance pole. Systems of lexicogrammar are the theoretical means of representing the lexical item as potential, since a lexical item is the synthetic realisation of a bundle of the most delicate features of the system.

[6] This is true, and could not be otherwise.

[7] To be clear, Halliday and Matthiessen (2014: 76) are concerned with the grammatical classes of the word as rank scale unit, not with lexical items:

The class of an item indicates in a general way its potential range of grammatical functions. Hence words can be assigned to classes in a dictionary, as part of their decontextualised definition. But the class label does not show what part the item is playing in any actual structure. For that we have to indicate its function. The functional categories provide an interpretation of grammatical structure in terms of the overall meaning potential of the language.

Again, the implication is that the application of instantiation to lexis is Fontaine's idea, established in this paper, rather than a dimension of SFL Theory devised by Halliday.

[8] Here Fontaine explicitly claims the application of instantiation to lexis as her own idea, established in this paper, rather than a dimension of SFL Theory devised by Halliday.

[9] To be clear, this is a non-sequitur. The instantiation relation between lexical item as potential and instance does not relocate lexis from lexicogrammar to context, local or otherwise. This non-sequitur is the theoretical proposal of this paper.

[10] To be clear, Fig. 3 does not illustrate the notion of lexis as most local context, since it locates lexeme and lexical item in language, not context, and does not represent a dimension of 'locality'.

[11] As was also the case for Fig. 2, this diagram misrepresents Halliday's model, since it locates different perspectives on the same point on the cline of instantiation — for context (cultural domain/situation type) and language (register/text type) — as different points on the cline.

[12] To be clear, Fig. 3 misrepresents 'lexeme' as sub-potential instead of potential, and 'lexical item' as instance type rather than instance.

[13] To be clear, lexical items, as both potential and instance, are located on the stratum of lexicogrammar.

"Separate Lexemes, Despite The Similar Form"

Fontaine (2017: 12-3):

Hanks’ solution is to identify the main semantic components as constituting the meaning potential of the lexeme. The semantic components for BANK include, according to Hanks (2013:70):

IS an institution.
IS a large building.
FOR storage.
FOR safekeeping of things.
FOR (esp.) safekeeping of finance/money.
CARRIES out transactions.
CONSISTS of a staff of people.

Semantic components are “separate, combinable, exploitable entities” (ibid.). The instantiated lexical item such as in (9) or (10) will involve some combination of the components. Using semantic components this way enables a clearer sense of where the division between polysemy and homonymy lies. For example, BANK as in river bank does not share any semantic components with BANK in the examples which suggests separate lexemes, despite the similar form. For Hanks, a word gets its meaning from its use and in this sense, meaning is dynamic.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, these two homonyms are also construed as distinct lexical items in SFL Theory, since SFL views language 'from above' — from the perspective of the meaning that is realised — and each word construes a different meaning. This is clearly unknown to Fontaine, since she has cited work from a different theory to make the point.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the term 'word' involves two distinct abstractions: (i) word as a grammatical rank unit that realises functions of group/phrase structure, and (ii) word as lexical item that realises the most delicate features of lexicogrammatical systems. The meaning of a word is thus construed by both its grammatical function and lexical specification. The use of a word is its instantiation during logogenesis, and the dynamics of meaning are modelled in terms of the three dimensions of semogenesis: logogenesis, ontogenesis and phylogenesisis.

"An Account Of Word Meaning Needs To Consider Lexical Semantics"

Fontaine (2017: 12):

If we consider Hanks’ example of BANK (2013:68–71), we can see that an account of word meaning needs to consider lexical semantics and this needs to be reflected in the lexical representation of the model. In considering various uses of BANK such as those in examples (3) and (4), both taken from Hanks (2013:68-69), the question arises whether the senses are related and if so whether “we go along with Pustejovsky, who would say that they are all part of the same ‘lexical conceptual paradigm’ (Pustejovsky, 1995)” (Hanks, 2013:69).

(3) [He] assaulted them in a bank doorway 

(4) using a technique of photographic superimposition and then later a system of addition using banks of condensers

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, lexical semantics is an account of word meaning. However, the lexical semantics, in this case, is an approach which, inconsistent with SFL Theory, looks at the word 'from below' as a form to which meanings are assigned.

[2] As previously explained, the notion of lexical representation in a mental lexicon is inconsistent with SFL Theory and 'the known facts of human biology and brain science' (Edelman 1989: 228).

[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, this question does not arise, because the lexical item is viewed 'from above'. From the perspective of the meaning being expressed, the word bank in (3) and the word banks in (4) express different meanings and, as such, constitute different lexical items.

"The Meaning Potential Of A Lexeme"

Fontaine (2017: 12):

In terms of lexical meaning, Hanks (2013:65) states his position as follows: “strictly speaking, words in isolation have meaning potential rather than meaning, and that actual meanings are best seen as events, only coming into existence when people use words, putting them together in clauses and sentences”. This position needs to be re-expressed in more SFL terms. The reference to ‘words in isolation’ can be equated to Hanks’ use of lemma, a term used in corpus linguistics to capture an abstract or uninflected form of a lexical item. This is equivalent to the term lexeme, which is typically used in psycholinguistic research. The terminology here is not very important but since lexeme has been used throughout this paper, we will continue to use it. What is significant is Hanks’ view of the meaning potential of a lexeme. In this sense the semantics are represented as potential, as non-instantiated lexeme. The lexeme then has the full meaning potential, some of which (not necessarily all) is then activated when instantiated in text.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Hanks' "position" includes the SFL distinction between potential and instance, and this, at least, does not need "to be re-expressed in more SFL terms"; but see [3]. This confirms that Fontaine is unaware that SFL Theory already models lexis in terms of potential and instance.

[2] To be clear, although Formal approaches to lexicography are inconsistent with SFL Theory, 'lemma' approximates the SFL notion of lexical item. However, this is not equivalent to 'lexeme', which is closer to the SFL notion of a word as grammatical unit, since it is an abstraction that includes all the grammatical forms:

In morphology and lexicography, a lemma is the canonical form, dictionary form, or citation form of a set of words (headword). In English, for example, run, runs, ran and running are forms of the same lexeme, with run as the lemma by which they are indexed. Lexeme, in this context, refers to the set of all the forms that have the same meaning, and lemma refers to the particular form that is chosen by convention to represent the lexeme.

[3] To be clear, here Fontaine repeats Fawcett's confusion — evidence here — of 'meaning potential' (language as system) with meaning as a stratum of language (semantics: from potential to instance). The relation between lexical item as potential and lexical item as instance is the dimension of instantiation. The relation between a lexical item (as potential or instance) and the meaning (as potential or instance) that it realises, is the stratal relation between lexicogrammar and semantics.

"Lexical Meaning Is Seen As Primarily Collocational"

Fontaine (2017: 12):

At this point, I would like to refer to a lexicological approach to lexical analysis as described by Hanks (2013), which has two main advantages in my view. The first is that it makes clear the distinction between the lexeme as meaning potential and the lexical item as instance. The second is that lexical meaning is seen as primarily collocational and in this sense seems very much in line with what Halliday was proposing in his 1961 paper.

In the remainder of this section, Hanks’ (2013) approach to pattern analysis is adapted within SFL, drawing on the discussion of context given above and illustrated with a brief example to demonstrate how this might work.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the distinction between potential and instance applies to all strata, and so, to lexical items and the lexicogrammatical features that they realise. Fontaine is clearly unaware of this.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, collocation is concerned with relations on the syntagmatic axis (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 59), whereas the theoretical priority of SFL Theory is the paradigmatic axis (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 49).

[3] To be clear, even in his first theory, Scale and Category Grammar which, following Firth, gave equal weight to system and structure, Halliday (2002 [1961]: 60) identified both the paradigmatic and syntagmatic dimensions of lexis, lexical sets and collocation, as theoretically necessary:

What are needed are theoretical categories for the formal description of lexis. It seems that two fundamental categories are needed, which we may call collocation and set.

"Significant Theoretical Implications Which Could Send Reverberations Throughout The Framework"

Fontaine (2017: 11-2):

It could be argued that these stems [talk, walk] are ambiguous in terms of their lexical class. This would force us to consider their lexical representation and we could ask whether they should be represented as the same lexeme or different (this could be considered in terms of polysemy or homonymy). Luuk (2010:362) argues that “they are neither nouns nor verbs but flexibles”, i.e. polysemous lexemes. This suggests that in terms of lexical representation that there is one lexeme which encodes this type of flexibility but this is not true of all nouns or verbs so there must be something specific to this set (see Davies, 2004). According to Luuk, an implication of the assumption that accompanies alternative solutions for these items (either zero derivation or homophony) is that they “posit unnecessary hidden structure” (ibid., see also Don, 2005). At the moment, it would seem that SFL would assume homonymy but whether it would or would not consider such a solution is an unanswered question. In Fontaine (2017b), I argue for a preference for polysemy in lexical representation within the SFL framework. In considering the case of prepositions and particles, I show how this is not inconsistent with current SFL descriptions of English. While such representations may seem trivial at first sight, they have significant theoretical implications, which could send reverberations throughout the framework.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this could not be argued, because word classes, such as noun and verb, are grammatical, not lexical. That is, Fontaine has again confused the word as lexical item with word as grammatical rank scale unit.

[2] To be clear, this would not "force us to consider their lexical representation" because the notion of lexical representation in a mental lexicon is inconsistent with SFL Theory, and with 'the known facts of human biology and brain science (Edelman 1989: 228).

[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the noun talk and the verb talk — like the noun walk and the verb walk — are different words grammatically, noun versus verb, but the same word lexically. Polysemy and homonymy are irrelevant considerations, since a word is viewed from the meaning expressed ('from above'), not from the form that expresses ('from below').

[4] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL Theory, discussions of nouns and verbs are concerned with grammatical word classes, not lexical items. Again, the theoretical approach here is inconsistent with SFL Theory, since it views the word 'from below', as a form which is assigned different meanings.

[5] To be clear, SFL Theory "assumes" neither homonymy nor polysemy, since both assume the view 'from below', as previously explained.

[6] To be clear, 'preposition' and 'particle' are classes of word as grammatical unit, rather than lexical item, and arguing for polysemy takes the view 'from below'. The proposal in Fontaine (2017b) is thus inconsistent with theory-competent "SFL descriptions of English".

[7] To be clear, these fundamental misunderstandings of SFL Theory do not "have significant theoretical implications, which could send reverberations throughout the framework".

Confusing Grammatical Words With Lexical Items

Fontaine (2017: 11):

SFL is not alone in having to address these issues. In other areas of linguistics, such as in typological studies, “[t]he structure of the lexicon and its consequences for the language system have received much less attention” (Hengeveld, Rijkhoff and Siewierska, 2004:527). However, considering the structure of the lexicon forces the theory to engage with the associated assumptions. For example, in considering certain noun and verb pairs resulting from conversion, such as talk, walk, etc., Luuk (2010:352) explains that “[i]n English … tense-aspect-mood marking encodes predicate and determiners encode argument”. The fluidity between nouns and verbs in these cases raises interesting questions about word classes as I have argued elsewhere Fontaine (2017a).

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, the assumption of a mental lexicon is inconsistent with the assumptions of SFL Theory. Considering the assumptions of SFL theory forces a reconsideration of the assumption of the structure of a mental lexicon.

[2] To be clear, here again Fontaine confuses the notion of word as lexical item with word as a grammatical rank scale unit ('noun', 'verb', 'word class').

[3] To be clear, by including these observations from another theory, Fontaine confuses lexical items, which are the synthetic realisation of the most delicate lexicogrammatical features, with grammatical words that are the direct realisation of (less delicate) grammatical features.

Mistaking Grammatical Rank Units For Lexical Items

Fontaine (2017: 10-1):

The main reason for being be concerned with lexical representation relates to the role of lexical classification in descriptions of lexicogrammatical structure. It is generally agreed that structural units tend to take shape around ‘head’ items. For example, in analysis, we distinguish the nominal group from the verbal group in terms of the class of item functioning as the head element of the unit. The label of the lexical item (e.g. noun or verb) is not so important (cf. Fawcett, 2000). Nevertheless, the classification of lexis and of units on the rank scale runs through grammatical description and indeed many key concepts in SFL theory, such as grammatical metaphor (see Taverniers, 2017). 

The example given in (1) provides an instance of ‘smack dab’ that is infrequent since it is instantiated here as a nominal but whether it is a single lexical item or not is a good question and so is whether or not its class or categorisation is important (see discussion of transcategorisation in Halliday and Matthiessen, 1999). Knowing its etymology helps in part, the OED lists it as an adverb (“smack dab” adv. 2016) but as speakers we know something about its frequency too. It is by far more frequently instantiated as in (2). If categorisation or class of unit are important to the theory, as I think they are, then a more developed description of lexical representation is needed since the nature of the lexical item as instantiated form has serious impact on the theoretical model.

(1) in the course of 2 years I’ve gotten used to living in the equivalent of a medium-sized house right in the smack dab of Central London 

(2) that puts your street address smack dab in the middle of the map

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here again Fontaine confuses the word as lexical item with word as a grammatical unit on the rank scale: nouns and verbs as grammatical classes and constituents of nominal and verbal groups.

[2] As previously explained, the notion of lexical representation in a mental lexicon is inconsistent with SFL Theory and, as Edelman (1989: 228) argues, inconsistent with 'the known facts of human biology and brain science'.

[3] To be clear, this is a use of smack dab by someone who mistakenly thinks it means 'middle' instead of 'precisely'.

[4] To be clear, in SFL Theory, such questions are answered by taking a paradigmatic perspective. In this example, smack dab is agnate with middle, which would make it a lexical item — though one that is unlikely to be used by native speakers of English.

[5] To be clear, this is the grammatical class of smack dab, not its etymology.

"If We Consider The Possibility That The Lexical Item Construes The Meaning Potential Of The Lexeme"

Fontaine (2017: 10):

Context, co-text and collocation: Where do (new) meanings come from?

Since within the SFL framework, grammar and lexis are considered, as mentioned above (cf. Martin, 1992), as in essence the same but differentiated by degrees of generality, it is difficult to talk about lexical meaning outside of grammar. However, while I would agree this is not effectively possible since every lexical item is instantiated in text and therefore is fully integrated in the grammatical construction in which it appears. However, if we consider the possibility that the lexical item construes the meaning potential of the lexeme, then we can begin to see a way to capture lexical meaning through the lens of context, even if this is by analogy.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained here, grammar and lexis are not "in essence the same", since they differ in kind both syntagmatically and paradigmatically. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 59, 64):

On either of these two axes we can establish relationships of a lexical kind (collocations and sets) and of a grammatical kind (structures and systems). …

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the meaning of a lexical item is the semantic correlate of the lexicogrammatical features that specify a lexical item. The reason Fontaine uses the term 'lexical meaning' is that she draws on work from theories that are inconsistent with SFL Theory, where the distinction is between form and meaning, and where lexis is viewed 'from below' (from form), such that a lexical item, as form, can be assigned several meanings.

[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, lexical items, like all of language, are modelled as both potential and instance, not just as instance.

[4] To be clear, here Fontaine again confuses word as lexical item with word as grammatical constituent. It is the word as grammatical constituent that is "fully integrated in the grammatical construction in which it appears", not the word as lexical item.

[5] To be clear, here Fontaine confuses the theoretical dimension of stratification (lexical item construes meaning) with the dimension of instantiation (lexical item as instance of potential).

[6] To be clear, this suggests that Fontaine is unaware that SFL already models the lexical item as both potential and instance.

[7] To be clear, in SFL Theory, context is the culture as semiotic system — instantiated as a situation — which is realised in language (and other semiotic systems). Considering this unnecessary appeal to context, together with [3] and [6], it would appear that Fontaine thinks that the cline of instantiation only applies to the stratum of context.

"The Need For Flexibility In Lexical Representation"

Fontaine (2017: 10):

In other functional approaches, the need for flexibility in lexical representation is being identified. For example, more flexible lexical representations and flexible lexicon (García Velasco, 2016), flexible word classes (Rijkhoff and van Lier, 2013) and fluid grammar (Steels and De Beule, 2006 and Steels, 2011). Indeed, cognitive models also suggest the need for a more flexible grammar. Pickering and Garrod (2004:21) state that their model of interactive alignment “challenges linguists to come up with a more flexible account of grammar capable of capturing linguistic constraints on linked sentence fragments”. While a detailed look at flexible models is beyond the scope of this paper, these approaches have influenced my thinking on this topic. In the next section I will argue for a loosening of semantics in terms of lexical representation to allow for the meaning potential (Hanks, 2013) of a lexeme instantiated by a lexical item.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the needs of theories that do not share the same theoretical assumptions and method of inquiry are not evidence of the needs of SFL Theory. The need for this type of flexibility in such approaches stems from viewing language 'from below' (from the expression of meaning) rather than 'from above' (from the meaning that is expressed) — the latter being the perspective taken in SFL Theory.

[2] As previously explained, the notion of lexical representation in a mental lexicon is inconsistent with SFL Theory and, as Edelman (1989: 228) argues, inconsistent with 'the known facts of human biology and brain science'.

[3] As will be seen in the examination of the next section, this loosening of semantics — despite the location of lexical items on the lexicogrammatical stratum — involves viewing language 'from below', such that a single form is the expression of different meanings. This is the opposite perspective of the  view 'from above' in SFL Theory, which takes meaning as the point of departure, and inquires as to how it is expressed lexically.

[4] To be clear, unknown to Fontaine, the instantiation relation between a lexical item as potential and as instance is already part of the architecture of SFL Theory, and it is a relation that obtains on the lexicogrammatical stratum, not the semantic stratum.

"Some Issues That Need To Be Resolved"

Fontaine (2017: 10):

There are some issues that need to be resolved if we want to claim as Hasan does that realisation mediates between networks and structures (Hasan, 1996:74) since as concerns lexis, this suggests that a single lexical item is “the expression of a set of choices made in the system network” (Halliday, 1972/2013:8). The close connection of delicacy and paradigmatic arrangement can only take us so far; e.g. if lexical meaning is in part at least in its collocational associations or frames, it is difficult to think of lexical meaning as having paradigmatic relations. Even the definition of word and lexical item or the distinction between lexical/content words and grammatical/function words are areas which are not yet fully explained in terms of lexical representation.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, there are no theoretical "issues that need to be resolved" here. As will be seen below, the "issues" only arise from Fontaine's lack of familiarity with SFL Theory.

[2] To be clear, this is not merely Hasan's claim, but a statement of the architecture of SFL Theory. The relation between the paradigmatic axis (system) and the syntagmatic axis (structure) is realisation; that is, they are different levels of symbolic abstraction: structure (Token) realises system (Value).

[3] To be clear, the Hasan quote on grammar does not "suggest" the Halliday quote on lexis. Hasan is concerned with the realisation relation between grammatical systems and grammatical structures, such as those of clause rank, whereas Halliday is concerned with the realisation relation between the most delicate grammatical systems and lexical items (which are not structures).

[4] To be clear, the "close connection of delicacy and paradigmatic arrangement" is that delicacy is the ordering principle of paradigmatic order (system); see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 20).

[5] To be clear, collocation is the syntagmatic dimension of lexical items, whereas paradigmatically, lexical items function in sets. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 61):

Paradigmatically, lexical items function in sets having shared semantic features and common patterns of collocation. … Typically, the semantic features that link the members of a lexical set are those of synonymy or antonymy, hyponymy and meronymy;

[6] To be clear, in addition to the paradigmatic relations between lexical items — synonymy etc. — each lexical item is specified by a bundle of paradigmatic features, just as, on the phonological stratum, the phoneme /k/ is specified by the feature bundle [voiceless, velar, stop].

[7] To be clear, these aspects "are not yet fully explained in terms of lexical representation" because the notion of lexical representation in a mental lexicon is inconsistent with SFL Theory and, according to Edelman (1989: 228), with 'the known facts of human biology and brain science'.

However, within SFL Theory, the distinction between word as grammatical unit and word as lexical item is clearly defined (see the previous quote from Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 568-9), as is the distinction between 'grammatical/function' words, and 'lexical/content' words. Unlike 'lexical' words, 'grammatical' words are those that 'function as the direct realisation of terms in grammatical systems' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 64).

"SFL Needs To Offer Detail On Multiword Expressions And On Polysemy Vs Homonymy"

Fontaine (2017: 10):

However, the nature of lexical representation is not clearly articulated in SFL. As Davidse (2017:79) makes very clear, “linguistic theories specify one’s fundamental assumptions about language and the nature of the linguistic sign. It is within these assumptions that the facts of a language are described – that is, its categories identified and interpreted”. The preference in lexical representation for homonymy or polysemy is not theory neutral, there are assumptions related to each position. SFL needs to offer detail on multiword expressions (MWEs) and on polysemy vs homonymy.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, lexical representation in a mental lexicon is inconsistent with SFL Theory, which accounts for its lack of articulation in SFL Theory.

[2] This is very true. This is why it is very important to understand the assumptions of the theory being used.

[3] This is very true. The assumptions on which lexical representation and modelling lexis in terms of homonymy and polysemy are based are those of other theories, and are not consistent with the assumptions of SFL Theory.

[4] To be clear, as already explained, the notions of polysemy and homonymy view the lexical item 'from below', which is inconsistent with SFL Theory, which views the lexical item 'from above': the meaning it realises. Polysemy views the lexical item as grammatical form that realises many meanings, whereas homonymy views the lexical item as (shared) phonological form.

The approach of SFL Theory to multi-word expressions, such as phrasal verbs, is systemic. For example, the experiential function of put up with as a Process is argued by reference to its agnate tolerate.

Fontaine's Argument Against Lexis As Most Delicate Grammar

Fontaine (2017: 9-10):

As mentioned above, Martin points out the backgrounding of lexis in SFL, suggesting that this is related to an account of lexis as most delicate grammar. This view of lexis brings with it some degree of risk since it could result in treating lexis as taxonomically organised and this could lead to prioritising homophonous lexical relations rather than semantic ones. The reason for this is that if we take as a starting point Halliday's (1972/2013:8) view that “the output of any path through the network of systems is a structure”, the ‘most’ delicate system will lead directly to a lexical item (cf criticisms by Hunston and Francis, 2000 and Groom, 2005). This is a view of lexical representation which would be very difficult to accept for most lexicologists as it would predict that a lexeme with polysemes would need to be available at the terminal point of a variety of systems.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misunderstands Martin's claim. To be clear, Martin claims that what has been backgrounded is Halliday's distinction between grammatical words and lexical items and a syntagmatic perspective on lexical items. Martin (2016:45):

Firth's interest in collocation (‘the company words keep’) has been developed in corpus linguistic research – chiefly by Sinclair and his colleagues (e.g. 1966; 1991) but less so in SFL where Halliday's early acknowledgement of the distinction between words and lexical items and the need for a syntagmatic perspective on expectancy relations among lexical items has tended to be backgrounded in relation to an interest in lexis as delicate grammar (the ‘grammarian's dream’, pursued by Hasan, and others).

See here for the misunderstandings in Martin's claim.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, paradigmatically, relations between lexical items can be represented as hyponymic and meronymic taxonomies. It is just such relations that are exploited in lexical cohesion.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. To classify lexical items in terms of how they are realised in phonology ("homophonous') is to take the view 'from below', which is the direct opposite of SFL Theory, which takes the view 'from above' (the meaning being realised in wording).

[4] This is a non-sequitur. The specification of grammatical structures and lexical items by lexicogrammatical systems does not entail classifying lexical items according to how they are realised in phonology.

[5] See here for the misunderstandings of Hunston and Francis (2000). (Fontaine does not outline the criticisms of Groom (2005).)

[6] To be clear, as [3] demonstrates, this is a view that is not consistent with SFL Theory, and as [4] demonstrates, this is a view that is not validated by Fontaine's argument. Moreover, the acceptability judgements of lexicologists are irrelevant to SFL Theory, unless they uncover inconsistency in the architecture of SFL Theory, or inabilities of the theory to account for data.

[7] This is misleading, because it is untrue. On the one hand, Fontaine again takes the view 'from below', identifying lexemes as expressions of many meanings ("polysemes"), instead of the SFL view 'from above', where a lexeme is identified as the meaning that is expressed. On the other hand, the conclusion does not follow from the argument presented, as [3] and [4] demonstrate.

Halliday's "Call To Develop Work" On Lexical Representation

Fontaine (2017: 9):

The call to develop work in this area can be traced back to Halliday's 1961 paper, where he put forward the ground-breaking idea that “the ‘lexical item,’ is unrestricted grammatically; grammatical categories do not apply to it, and the abstraction of the item itself from a number of occurrences … depends on the formal, lexical relations into which it enters” (1961:277). At that time, he expected that “it should not be long before we find out much more about how language works at this level” (ibid.), since working out large scale frequencies of items in collocation would no longer be difficult. However, we have not yet seen this kind of detailed work, perhaps with the exception of Tucker (e.g. 1996).

Blogger Comments:

This is misleading, because it is untrue. To be clear, Halliday (1961) — on Scale and Category Grammar, not Systemic Functional Grammar — is not a "call to develop work" in lexical representation. Rather, its stated purpose is demonstrate how 'to bring lexis in relation to grammar', which, importantly, involves distinguishing the lexical item from the word as grammatical unit. Halliday (2002 [1961]: 59-61):

8 Lexis
8.1 This section is intended merely to bring lexis into relation with grammar, not to discuss the theory of lexis as such. As has been pointed out (above, 3.3. and 6.3), there is no one / one correspondence in exponence between the item which enters into lexical relations and any one of the grammatical units. It is for this reason that the term lexical item is used in preference to word, “word” being reserved as the name for a grammatical unit, that unit whose exponents, more than those of any other unit, are lexical items. 

Not only may the lexical item be coextensive with more than one different grammatical unit; it may not be coextensive with any grammatical unit at all, and may indeed cut right across the rank hierarchy. Moreover, since the abstraction involved is quite different, what is for lexis “the same” lexical item (that is, different occurrences of the same formal item) may be a number of different grammatical items, so it is not true that one lexical item always has the same relation to the rank hierarchy. So that, in English, (i) a lexical item may be a morpheme, word or group (at least); (ii) a lexical item may be assigned to no rank, being for example more than a word but less than a whole group, or even both more and less than a word – part of one word plus the whole of another, sometimes discontinuously; and (iii) one and the same lexical item may in different occurrences cover any range of the possibilities under (i) and (ii). 

This does not mean that lexical items cannot be identified in grammar; it means that they are not identified by rank. They are identified, as has been suggested (above, 6.3), by their being unaccounted for in systems. But it is an additional, descriptive reason (additional, that is, to the theoretical one that lexical items lend themselves to different relations of abstraction) for keeping grammar and lexis apart. When the two have been described separately, the next stage is to relate them; and it is here that the complex relation between lexical item and grammatical unit must be accounted for. This is exactly parallel to what was said above (7.1) about grammar and phonology; and, of course, it applies equally to phonology and lexis, where, after separate description, is displayed the relationship between the lexical item and the categories of phonology. 

8.2 The task of lexis can be summed up, by illustration, as that it has to account for the likelihood of wingless green insects and for the, by contrast, unlikelihood of colourless green ideas. As in grammar, we shall expect language to work by contrasting “more likely” with “less likely” rather than “possible” with “impossible”; but, as has often been pointed out, this particular type of likelihood is not accounted for by grammar, at least not by grammar of the delicacy it has yet attained. It is, however, too often assumed that what cannot be stated grammatically cannot be stated formally: that what is not grammar is semantics, and here, some would add, linguistics gives up. But the view that the only formal linguistics is grammar might be described as a colourless green idea that sleeps furiously between the sheets of linguistic theory, preventing the bed from being made. What are needed are theoretical categories for the formal description of lexis. 

It seems that two fundamental categories are needed, which we may call collocation and set. The first basic distinction between these and the categories of grammar is that in lexis there are no scales of rank and exponence. There is no hierarchy of units; therefore no rank scale. There is only one degree of abstraction – a set is a set of formal items and a collocation is a collocation of formal items; therefore no exponence scale (exponence there is, of course, but it is a simple polarity). Only the scale of delicacy remains; sets and collocations can be more and less delicate. 

There is an analogy with the categories of grammar, an analogy due to the nature of language as activity. Collocation, like structure, accounts for a syntagmatic relation; set, like class and system, for a paradigmatic one. There the resemblance ends. 

Collocation is the syntagmatic association of lexical items, quantifiable, textually, as the probability that there will occur, at n removes (a distance of n lexical items) from an item x, the items a, b, c . . . Any given item thus enters into a range of collocation, the items with which it is collocated being ranged from more to less probable; and delicacy is increased by the raising of the value of n and by the taking account of the collocation of an item not only with one other but with two, three or more other items. Items can then be grouped together by range of collocation, according to their overlap of, so to speak, collocational spread. The paradigmatic grouping which is thereby arrived at is the set. The set does not form a closed system, but is an open grouping varying in delicacy from “having some (arbitrary minimum) collocation in common” to subsets progressively differentiated as the degree of collocational likeness set as defining criterion increases. 

In lexis, as in grammar, it is essential to distinguish between formal and contextual meaning. Once the formal description has identified the categories and the items, these can and must be treated contextually. The formal item of lexis, the lexical item, is unrestricted grammatically; grammatical categories do not apply to it, and the abstraction of the item itself from a number of occurrences (including, for example, the answer to the question whether one is to recognise one lexical item or more than one) depends on the formal, lexical relations into which it enters. The nature of these relations is such that formal statements in lexis require textual studies involving large-scale frequency counts: not of course of the frequency of single items, but of items in collocation. Since these are no longer difficult to undertake, it should not be long before we find out much more about how language works at this level.

"Within SFL, Very Little Work Has Been Done On What Constitutes A Word"

Fontaine (2017: 9):

Within SFL, very little work has been done on what constitutes a word and it is often the case, as it is generally in linguistics, that the orthographic word is the default but this is problematic for a variety of reasons. The most important reason is because English orthography has not been consistent (into but out of, corkscrew but tea towel, etc.). Indeed, the very nature of what is a word cannot be taken for granted (see Wray 2014). The focus on the orthographic word is a real danger to studies of lexis and as corpus linguistics increases in popularity, it becomes even more important to challenge the assumptions surrounding the identification of lexical items. The status of the lexeme and indeed lexical representation within the theory is critically important, not just for the theory itself but for the areas it ventures into including applications and dialogue with other theories of language.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 568-9) are quite explicit:

The folk notion of the "word" is really a conflation of two different abstractions, one lexical and one grammatical.

(i) Vocabulary (lexis): the word as lexical item, or "lexeme". This is construed as an isolate, a 'thing' that can be counted and sorted in (alphabetical) order. People "look for" words, they "put thoughts into" them, "put them into" or "take them out of another's mouth", and nowadays they keep collections of words on their shelves or in their computers in the form of dictionaries. Specialist knowledge is thought of as a matter of terminology. The taxonomic organisation of vocabulary is less exposed: it is made explicit in Roget's Thesaurus, but is only implicit in a standard dictionary. Lexical taxonomy was the first area of language to be systematically studied by anthropologists, when they began to explore cultural knowledge as it is embodied in folk taxonomies of plants, animals, diseases and the like.

(ii) Grammar: the word as one of the ranks in the grammatical system. This is, not surprisingly, where Western linguistic theory as we know it today began in classical times, with the study of words varying in form according to their case, number, aspect, person etc.. Word-based systems such as these do provide a way in to studying grammatical semantics: but the meanings they construe are always more complex than the categories that appear as formal variants, and grammarians have had to become aware of covert patterns.

[2] To be clear, SFL Theory models linguistic phenomena 'from above'; that is, lexicogrammatical phenomena, such as words, are modelled in terms of the meaning they express. This is the direct opposite of viewing the word 'from below'; that is, in terms of how it is expressed (orthographically).

[3] As previously demonstrated, unknown to Fontaine, the status of the lexeme in SFL Theory is clearly defined, and the notion of lexical representation in a mental lexicon is inconsistent with both SFL Theory and, according to Edelman (1989: 228), 'the known facts of human biology and brain science'.

[4] To be clear, dialogue with other theories of language is dialogue with theories with different assumptions about language and how it is to be modelled.

"The Treatment Of Phrasal Verbs"

Fontaine (2017: 9):

As an example of the need for more explicitness on lexical representation, let’s consider the treatment of phrasal verbs, a type of multi-word expression (MWE), see Moon (1997) for a discussion of the many types of MWEs. Halliday and Matthiessen (2014:413) define them as “lexical verbs which consist of more than just the verb word itself”. 

Fawcett (2000) has a similar position but differs in how these forms are represented in the theory. He considers that the lexical items are effectively separate elements of the clause (i.e. main verb and main verb extension) but that these forms jointly realise the process. 

If phrasal verbs are single lexical items, although orthographically expressed as two, then they should be analysed in the same way as any other multi-morphemic lexical item, such as unhappiness or understand. 

The issue of their potential discontinuity is not necessarily a barrier to this approach. Evidence from neurolinguistics by Cappelle, Shtyrov & Pulvermuller (2010:200) supports the position “that language users store prefabricated chunks of lexical material which consist of more than one word and which can potentially be separated (e.g. heat the room up)”. If this is how these MWEs are stored, then grammatical description should reflect this and the theoretical framework should represent them as such. In other words, lexico-grammatical description should be, at least in part, based on (or include) what we know about the cognitive aspects involved, e.g. how linguistic items are stored.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, the notion of lexical representation in a mental lexicon is inconsistent with both SFL Theory (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999) and 'the known facts of human biology and brain science' (Edelman 1989: 228).

[2] To be clear, Halliday & Matthiessen's discussion of phrasal verbs is concerned with the word as grammatical unit — verb, preposition, adverb — not with the word as lexical item. Halliday and Matthiessen (2014: 413):

They are of two kinds, plus a third, which is a combination of the other two:

(i) verb + adverb, e.g. look out ‘unearth, retrieve’
(ii) verb + preposition, e.g. look for ‘seek’
(iii) verb + adverb + preposition, e.g. look out for ‘watch for the presence of’

[3] To be clear, Fawcett's 'main verb' and 'main verb extension' are concerned with the word as a grammatical constituent, not with the word as lexical item.

[4] To be clear, this is Halliday's model. Phrasal verbs realise the Process of a clause.

[5] To be clear, phrasal verbs are already modelled in SFL as single lexical items.

[6] To be clear, neurolinguistics and cognitive linguistics are founded on different assumptions about language which entail different approaches to modelling it. Importantly, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 595-9) analyse the model of cognitive science from the perspective of SFL Theory, showing, for example, how it reconstrues mental processes as material and relational processes.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 595-6):

Since figures of sensing are reified as participants, they can themselves be construed in participant roles. Here another feature of the folk model is taken oven its spatial metaphor is retained and further elaborated. Thus the mind is construed as a space where the metaphorical participants of sensing are involved in processes of doing & happening and of being & having: thoughts, concepts, memories, images are stored, located, retrieved, activated and so on.

"Making Lexical Representation In Terms Of A Mental Lexicon More Explicit In SFL"

Fontaine (2017: 8-9):

Cognitive studies, including evidence from psycholinguistics, seem unanimous in accepting the need for a mental lexicon and one that plays an important role in both language production and language understanding according to Butler (2009:59). He goes on to say that “in language production the activation of an item from the lexicon must be accompanied, or at least closely followed, by the pairing of that item with a syntactic configuration which, in combination with the lexical item, begins to realise the conceptual structure being expressed. This is clearly easier in a model which contains a lexicon than in one which does not” (ibid.). The question remains then whether something could be gained (or lost) by making lexical representation in terms of a mental lexicon more explicit in SFL.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, evidence from other theories, with different theoretical assumptions, is not evidence for what is needed in SFL Theory. Moreover, SFL Theory already demonstrates that lexicogrammar can be modelled without resorting to a mental lexicon. More importantly, as neuroscientist Gerald Edelman (1989: 228) has demonstrated, the notion of lexical representations in a mental lexicon is inconsistent with 'the known facts of human biology and brain science'.

[2] To be clear, this is an instance of the logical fallacy known as 'begging the question' (petitio principii):

In classical rhetoric and logic, begging the question is an informal fallacy that occurs when an argument's premises assume the truth of the conclusion, instead of supporting it. It is a type of circular reasoning: an argument that requires that the desired conclusion be true.

Butler assumes language production involves a lexicon in which items are activated, and concludes that a model of language production requires the inclusion of a lexicon.

[3] To be clear, this question does not "remain". Because 'lexical representation in terms of a mental lexicon' is inconsistent with SFL Theory, introducing it into SFL Theory necessarily results in a loss of theoretical consistency.

"The Lexical Items Must Be Somewhere"

Fontaine (2017: 8):

However, these positions are not necessarily entirely opposing. Butler (2009:59) suggests that “since a lexical item is defined by the selection expression through which it is generated, it could be claimed that there is in effect a kind of lexicon, and furthermore that the realisation statements attached to networks will specify the syntactic patterns associated with lexical items”. In this sense, there may need to be some kind of lexicon, a large, complex network of lexical entries (however they are defined). The lexical items must be somewhere and must be accounted for somehow in the model. It is perhaps worth noting that Fawcett (1994, 2014) describes modelling nouns in the computational implementation of his model of SFL. The representation is in the form of an ontological network but there is no examination of the nature of the lexical item itself, i.e. in terms of its form(s) and functions or its semantic properties. Due to limitations of space, a full discussion of this is not possible here. On the issue of lexis discussed at this point, Fawcett concludes that “Halliday’s original 1961 insight was well-founded, the only major modification needed being that lexically realised meanings are not necessarily most delicate’, in the sense of ‘at or near the terminal leaves of the system network” (1994:79).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, lexical items are accounted for, but they are not accounted for by a lexicon. Instead, lexical items are accounted for by the system networks of the lexicogrammatical stratum, whose most delicate features are synthetically realised by lexical items.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, features in networks are explanatory, not ontological; or as Halliday (2003 [1992]: 200) puts it:

They are not "reified": that is, they are not endowed with a spurious reality of their own.

Hunston and Francis Misunderstanding 'Lexis As Most Delicate Grammar'

Fontaine (2017: 8):

One interpretation of lexis as most delicate grammar is that they are somehow the end point of a bundle of system choices, which leads to a single lexical option. Hunston and Francis (2000:28) argue against this view:

If words have their typical phraseologies, such that words are not selected in isolation but in variable phrases, then it is unsatisfactory to propose that each lexical item is the end-point of an individual bundle of systemic choices. The best compromise that could be reached would be to propose that each bundle of system choices should end, not in a lexical item per se but in a ‘unit of meaning’. As units of meaning are, by their nature, indeterminate in extent, however, such an interpretation would involve system-choices leading to fuzzy-edged and overlapping units, at best.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is a serious misunderstanding of SFL Theory. To be clear, the specification of lexical items by bundles of the most delicate lexicogrammatical features does not entail that words are selected in isolation. Grammatically, words serve as functions in group and phrase structures, and so they are selected with other words in those structures. Lexically, words have co-occurrence tendencies, and these collocations are modelled in SFL Theory as serving a cohesive function.

[2] Again, this is a serious misunderstanding of SFL Theory. To be clear,  in SFL Theory, lexicogrammar (wording) is modelled in terms of the meaning it realises. That is, the lexicogrammatical features that specify lexical items are modelled in terms of meaning.

[3] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL Theory, units of meaning are not "by their very nature, indeterminate in extent". For example, the "units" of ideational meaning are the three types of phenomenon: sequence, figure, and element, which are congruently realised in wording as clause complex, clause and group/phrase, respectively (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 49). Their realisation in wording delimits, and so determines, the extent of each unit of meaning.

"The Question About Where The Lexical Items Are"

Fontaine (2017: 7-8):

It is often assumed that as the system networks become more delicate in terms of systemic choice, we find lexis in the most delicate systems. However, this is problematic in a number of ways. It is difficult to see how a lexeme could be represented as a choice in the system networks (although see Fawcett, 1994). The term ‘lexeme’ is used here in contrast to ‘lexical item’ in order to distinguish between an abstract entry in the mental lexicon (lexeme) and an instance of a lexeme in use (lexical item). However, the question is whether SFL needs to model lexemes or not. Questions of lexical representation have not been explicitly explored in detail, although Tucker’s work (1996, 1998, 2006, 2009) comes very close. The position of lexis in Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) is, theoretically, fully integrated into the grammar if we accept the theory’s assumption that “there is no need to postulate a separate ‘lexicon’ as a pre-existing entity on which the grammar is made to operate” (Halliday and Matthiessen, 1999: 199). If this is the case, it leaves open the question about where the lexical items are. One interpretation of lexis as most delicate grammar is that they are somehow the end point of a bundle of system choices, which leads to a single lexical option.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This unsourced assumption is misleading. To be clear, in SFL Theory, we do not "find lexis in the most delicate systems" and a lexical item is not "a choice in the system networks". Instead, different bundles of features of the most delicate systems specify different lexical items. That is, a lexical item and the features that specify it are different levels of symbolic abstraction: with lexical item as Token and its features as Value.

[2] This confirms that Fontaine assumes a mental lexicon of lexical representations, which, as previously explained, is inconsistent with both SFL Theory and the known facts of human biology and brain science.

[3] This interpretation (by Hunston & Francis 2000) is misleading. To be clear, lexical items are not "the end point of a bundle of system choices which leads to a single lexical option"; see [1] above. The "end points" in systems are the features that are conjointly realised by lexical items.

"A Lexical Entry In The Lexicon"

Fontaine (2017: 7):

While the approaches to lexis mentioned above certainly offer important insights to our understanding of lexis and lexico-grammar, they generally do not discuss in detail issues related to lexical representation or provide an account of what might be needed in terms of a lexical entry in the lexicon. As Martin (2016:45) points out:

Firth's interest in collocation (‘the company words keep’) has been developed in corpus linguistic research – chiefly by Sinclair and his colleagues (e.g. 1966; 1991) but less so in SFL where Halliday's early acknowledgement of the distinction between words and lexical items and the need for a syntagmatic perspective on expectancy relations among lexical items has tended to be backgrounded in relation to an interest in lexis as delicate grammar (the ‘grammarian's dream’, pursued by Hasan, and others).

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, the notion of lexical representation in a mental lexicon is inconsistent with SFL Theory and, as the neuroscientist Edelman (1989: 228) points out, with 'the known facts of human biology and brain science'. The first of these inconsistencies, at least, accounts for the lack of discussion of such matters in SFL approaches to lexis.

[2] To be clear, the quote from Martin (2016) has no bearing on lexical representation or lexical entries in "the" lexicon; see further below.

[3] Martin's proposition can be analysed as follows:

Halliday's early acknowledgement of the distinction between words and lexical items and the need for a syntagmatic perspective on expectancy relations among lexical items	has	tended to be backgrounded	in relation to an interest in lexis as delicate grammar
Subject	Finite	Predicator	Adjunct
Mood		Residue

To be clear, neither (i) the 'distinction of words and lexical items' nor (ii) 'expectancy relations among lexical items' are "backgrounded in relation to" lexis as most delicate grammar, because both are aspects of 'lexis as most delicate grammar'.

Firstly, 'lexis as most delicate grammar' means that lexical items are theorised as the synthetic realisation of the most delicate lexicogrammatical features. Secondly, the 'distinction of words and lexical items' distinguishes this view of lexis from the word as a grammatical rank, where it is the entry condition to grammatical systems. Thirdly, 'expectancy relations between lexical items' is the syntagmatic dimension of 'lexis as most delicate grammar', collocation, which is exploited to create textual cohesion.

Mistaking Grammatical Words For Lexical Items

Fontaine (2017: 7):

It is also worth mentioning work done on lexis within an SFL framework on verb sense classification. For example, Matthiessen (2014) and Thompson (2015) have both offered advances on lexical issues within transitivity. Discussions of transitivity configurations in SFL come very close to describing lexical representation for a given verb is typically the case in other approaches to transitivity. Finally, while there is no space here to discuss lexical modelling in computational approaches within SFL, it is worth noting very briefly work done by Fawcett, Tucker, and Lin, 1993; Fawcett, 1994; Matthiessen and Bateman, 1991; and O'Donnell, Cheng and Hitzeman, 1998 to name only a few. One important insight coming out of this work suggests there is a need for lexical representation of one kind or another, at least for computational applications.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here Fontaine confuses word as lexical item with word as grammatical rank unit. The verb is a class of grammatical unit, and discussions of verbs in relation to experiential grammar (transitivity) are discussions of the verb as a constituent of the verbal group realising the clause function: Process. Lexical items, on the other hand, are the synthetic realisation of a bundle of the most delicate lexicogrammatical features — analogous to the phoneme /b/ being the synthetic realisation of the feature bundle [voiced, bilabial, stop].

[2] To be clear, the need for lexical representation is not an "important insight" coming out of this work, because the notion of lexical representation, which assumes a mental lexicon, is inconsistent with both SFL Theory and the known facts of human biology and brain science, as previously noted.